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The events of September 11, 2001, will continue to influence our lives and livelihoods for 
many years to come. The tools of our industry were used on this day both as weapons of 
war and for aiding the survivors and their families. This issue of the Journal of 
Transportation Management s dedicated to all who lost their lives on that day and to the 
men and women of our industry who are working hard every day to keep this country 
strong. God Biess America!
Less than a week after the terrorist attacks. I was notified by Dana Campbell of the 
National Association of Small Trucking Companies [NASTC provides administrative services 
for Delta Nu Alpha] that a representative of the Library of Congress was seeking copies of 
an article published in the last issue of the Journal [Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2000]. 
The article, entitled "Terrorism and the Global Supply Chain: Where Are Your Weak Links?" 
was written by Kay Dobie, Milt Glisson, and Jim Grant. More than one member of Congress 
had evidently requested the article. I sincerely hope that the timely information provided 
in the article can be of some value in the fight against terrorism. Thanks to Kay, Milt, and 
Jim for their work and for allowing it to be published in the JTM.
The subject matter of this issue is not as diverse as in recent issues. In fact, four of the five 
articles address topics in various parts of the trucking industry. The lead article in this issue, 
by Joe Hanna and Arnold Maltz, takes a look at service expansion attempts by LTL carriers 
in the U.S. over the last twenty-five years. Porter's differentiation strategy framework forms 
the basis for the research. The second article, by Patricia Poli and Carl Scheraga, uses data 
envelopment analysis to study the relationship between functional orientation of senior 
managers and service quality in U.S. LTL motor carriers. The results of the study indicate 
that, among the study participants, most LTL motor carriers are relatively inefficient in their 
configuration of senior level managers. Tom Lambert and Hokey Min address the impact of 
state taxes on the location of truck terminals and the registration and plating of commercial 
trucks in the third article. They use a case study they developed involving Kentucky as the 
basis for the discussion. Rick Clarke takes a look at the extent of EDI and Internet 
technology diffusion in the motor carrier industry in the fourth article of this issue. He 
reports the results of an email survey of 43 of the largest 75 U.S. motor carriers. In the final 
article of this issue, we finally leave land and head to sea! Shashi Kumar identifies several 
generic ocean common carrier business strategies and compares them to contemporary 
supply chain management practices. He also discusses the impact of the Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act of 1998 on ocean liner operations and strategy selection. As always, I hope you 
take the time to read each of the articles in this issue.
The DNA Board of Directors voted recently to increase the subscription price of the JTM. 
This price increase is the first in the history of the publication—it was a decision that 
needed to be made. Effective immediately, the price of a domestic subscription will rise 
to $50 per year, and international subscriptions will be $65 per year. We feel that the 
Journal's still very much a bargain at the new higher price. We hope that you will agree!
In closing, remember that we cannot survive and continue to publish without reader 
support. Please join or renew your membership in Delta Nu Alpha International 
Transportation Fraternity and subscribe to the Journal of Transportation Management 
Remember that if you join DNA at the gold level, a subscription to the JTM\s included in 
your membership! Share this issue with a colleague and encourage him or her to subscribe 
today!
Jerry W. Wilson, Editor
Journal of Transportation Management
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considering the submission of an article to the 
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The opinions expressed in published articles are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the opinions of the Editor, the Editorial 
Review Board, Delta Nu Alpha Transportation 
Fraternity, or Georgia Southern University.
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ANALYZING THE EVOLUTION OF 
CLASS I LTL MOTOR CARRIERS: 
AN EXAMINATION OF EXPANSION 
INTO WAREHOUSING
Joe B. Hanna 
Auburn University
Arnold B. Maltz 
Arizona State University
ABSTRACT
The current research uses Porter’s differentiation strategy framework to examine Class I LTL 
motor carrier service expansion habits over the last twenty years. The examination focuses 
on carriers bundling transportation and warehousing services together to help differentiate 
their service offerings from competitors. Results indicate that carriers are expanding service 
offerings to include warehousing services and are providing significant value-added services 
to customers. Continuous growth in warehouse service expansion was evident from passage 
of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 to the mid-90’s.
INTRODUCTION
Since deregulation in 1980 the market 
environment faced by motor carriers has 
changed dramatically (Corsi et al., 1991; Feitler 
et al., 1998; Harper, 1983; Sliverman et al., 
1997). The environmental changes have altered 
relationships between shippers and carriers and 
created a mutual dependence (Crum and Allen, 
1991). While the bulk of logistics research has 
typically focused on the shipper, motor carriers 
also face many new challenges (Corsi et al., 
1991). Attracting and retaining customers is 
one of the most critical challenges facing carriers
because it is vital to their long-term success 
(Stock, 1988). Carriers successful in meeting 
this challenge can build and maintain a solid 
customer base, enhancing the future outlook for 
the carrier (Rinehart, 1989).
Throughout the 1980’s and 90’s significant 
changes in the strategic orientation of motor 
carriers has occurred (Feitler et al., 1998; 
Silverman et al., 1997). Some carriers have 
attempted to attract and retain customers by 
pursuing strategies designed to differentiate 
themselves from competitors. They believe suffi­
cient customization and/or bundling of services
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may be one way to differentiate them from other 
carriers (Rinehart, 1989). There are several 
reasons why customizing or bundling services 
may help to retain customers.
First, many buyers of third-party logistics 
services are reducing their supplier bases 
(Delaney, 1998). Creating and maintaining a 
supplier relationship takes up valuable 
resources. The customer must identify potential 
suppliers, negotiate agreements, and process 
paperwork. Unless absolutely necessary, 
customers are increasingly reluctant to deplete 
resources to support a myriad of external 
logistics service providers. Instead they prefer to 
have a limited number of high quality external 
providers offer multiple services integrated 
together. To remain on their customers 
exclusive supplier list, some carriers are 
attempting to build long-term strategic alliances 
with key customers by bundling multiple 
logistics functions together to expand the 
availability of service offerings.
Second, carriers face significant competition 
from other carriers and integrated third-party 
logistics providers. Previous studies have 
examined the impact of integrated service 
providers on both logistics outsourcing usage 
(Leib and Maltz, 1998; Lieb and Randall, 1996; 
Sink and Langley, 1997) and motor carrier 
strategy (Feitler et al., 1998; Harper, 1983). 
Results of these studies indicate the third-party 
logistics market will continue to grow (Sink and 
Langley, 1997) and customers will be 
increasingly interested in “one-stop shopping” 
(Leib and Maltz, 1998). Many carriers want to 
take advantage of these market conditions and 
establish themselves as a leading edge logistics 
provider by differentiating themselves from 
competitors. To establish a credible reputation 
in the marketplace and remain competitive, 
many carriers have pursued a strategy of 
providing a variety of high quality customized 
services. As a result, some motor carriers have 
enhanced their competitive position and 
experienced considerable growth by expanding 
the number of services offered to customers 
(Crum and Allen, 1991).
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was particularly 
troublesome for the Less-Than-Truckload (LTL) 
segment of the motor carrier industry (Corsi et 
al., 1991). The net impact of deregulation on the 
motor carrier industry has generally been 
positive (Winston et al., 1990). However, ad­
justing to the free market environment has been 
a fatal process for some carriers (LaLonde, 1984- 
1985). Bankruptcies have increased since 
deregulation (Harper and Johnson, 1987) and 
LTL motor carrier profits declined by 
approximately $5.3 billion in the ten years 
subsequent to deregulation (Corsi et al., 1991).
Prior to deregulation carriers had little incentive 
to expand service offerings to customers. As a 
result, most regulated carriers were solely 
transportation providers. Since deregulation, 
the number of participants in the LTL motor 
carrier industry has declined significantly 
(Fietler et al., 1998). In response to a “free” 
market environment characterized by high 
concentration levels, many carriers have been 
compelled to adjust their business strategy to 
survive.
As environmental conditions changed, carriers 
responded by making adjustments to their 
strategy in order to remain competitive. 
Strategy is a pattern of firm behavior which 
helps guide the future direction of the business 
(Hambrink, 1983). Porter asserts that there are 
three broad generic strategies which can be used 
to help achieve a competitive advantage (Porter, 
1980). The three strategies are cost leadership, 
differentiation, and focus (Porter, 1980). While 
three strategies exist, he notes most successful 
companies typically implement one generic 
strategy in pure form instead of blending the 
strategies (Porter, 1980).
Cost leadership is striving to achieve lower costs 
than the competition. Focus is concentrating on 
a particular market segment. Differentiation is 
attempting to offer products or services that 
distinguish your offerings from the competition 
(Porter, 1980). The level of differentiation
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achieved is the degree to which the product or 
service and its enhancements are perceived as 
unique (Hambrink, 1983a and 1983b).
Porter’s three generic strategies have all been 
empirically tested. The results of several studies 
(Dess and Davis, 1980; Miller, 1987; Miller 1986; 
White, 1986) support the usefulness of Porter’s 
strategy framework. While all three strategies 
are an important part of Porter’s framework, 
differentiation is the generic strategy of primary 
interest in the current research.
There are many ways to achieve industry wide 
differentiation, including providing superior 
technology (Porter, 1980), offering unique fea­
tures (Porter, 1980), and improving performance 
levels (Rothschild, 1984). Immediately after 
deregulation some carrier managers began 
bundling two or more logistics services together 
to provide the customer a unique combination of 
services. Bundling is taking place when two or 
more products or services are sold as a single 
package (Nagle, 1984). Many carrier managers 
felt they could differentiate their firm from 
competitors by offering customers a bundle of 
customized services at a competitive price.
Bundling can take many forms. However, the 
primary type of bundling examined in this 
research is mixed bundling. Mixed bundling is 
offering to provide each service separately or 
bundle the requested services together for resale 
(Paun, 1993). Immediately after deregulation, 
some LTL carriers began to practice mixed 
bundling. The researchers believe carriers 
attempted this strategy primarily for two 
reasons. First, they perceived the practice as 
constituting a unique service offering. Second, 
bundles are typically priced so the sum of the 
services packaged together is less than the price 
of purchasing each of the services separately 
(VanBuer, Venta, and Zydiak, 1997). Therefore, 
bundling might allow the carrier to offer a more 
competitive price to the marketplace.
In contrast to the lower prices often achieved by 
mixed bundling, Porter contends that as more 
resources are dedicated to achieving a differ­
entiation strategy, the price of the service may 
need to be increased (Porter, 1980). Higher 
prices may reduce the ability of the firm to 
compete in a highly competitive marketplace 
(Porter, 1980). However, carriers successful in 
providing several unique competitive logistics 
services at a competitive price are often 
rewarded by customer loyalty. As the level of 
loyalty increases, competitors have a more 
difficult time convincing the customer to change 
providers, effectively reducing competition. 
Firms successfully differentiating their services 
from others may also notice customers becoming 
less sensitive to variables like price and length of 
contract.
Introducing competition to the motor carrier 
industry is a potential impetus for changes in 
strategy. The strategic re-evaluation under­
taken by many carriers has attempted to address 
the issue of how to attract and retain customers 
and enhance profit. Recent studies have shown 
that pursuing a differentiation strategy is 
associated with improved carrier performance 
levels (Feitler et al., 1998). Some carriers be­
lieve one potential differentiation strategy for 
the LTL segment may be to expand and 
customize service offerings. While many service 
expansion opportunities exist, past studies 
indicate many firms tend to group transportation 
and warehousing services together because of the 
interface often required between the two services 
(Lieb and Randall, 1996; McGinnis et al., 1994; 
Turner, 1997). Additionally warehousing has 
been identified in prior research as a frequently 
outsourced logistics service (Holcomb, et al., 
1997; Sink and Langley, 1997). Therefore, one 
relatively popular option for carriers is to 
augment LTL transportation by bundling it with 
customized warehousing services.
PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of the current study is to gain 
insight into the evolution of the Class I LTL 
general freight motor carrier industry since 
deregulation. Specifically the research will 
examine how carriers have adjusted their 
strategic orientation since passage of the Motor
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Carrier Act of 1980. This will be accomplished 
by examining: 1) the number of carriers offering 
warehousing services at a given point in time, 2) 
the types of warehousing services offered by 
carriers, 3) how each carrier achieved the service 
expansion, and 4) the growth rates of carriers 
bundling transportation and warehousing 
services together.
First, it is currently unclear what percentage of 
LTL carriers actually offer true warehouse 
services and which carriers simply claim to offer 
warehousing. The number of carriers aug­
menting transportation with warehousing will be 
identified. Second, there are many types of 
ancillary services (e.g., sorting or sequencing, 
price marking, bar coding and tracking, etc.) 
each carrier can offer in their warehousing 
division. The availability of these services and 
their level of customization will be investigated. 
Third, insight will be gained into how each 
carrier acquired the warehousing space needed 
for the service expansion. This includes 
examining the number of carriers acquiring 
warehouse space from each of three possible 
scenarios (internal, strategic alliance/partner, 
and external). Fourth, the timing of expansion 
will be examined by creating an innovation path. 
The path will illustrate the number of carriers 
offering warehousing services at a specific point 
in time. If significant growth levels are evident 
and numerous carriers now offer warehousing, 
one must question if offering an additional 
service like warehousing is truly a “unique” 
service offering. Offering multiple services may 
over time become a requirement for carriers 
wishing to remain competitive in the market­
place. As this becomes the case, service 
expansion may no longer be an avenue to a 
successful differentiation strategy.
Service bundling is not likely to be a successful 
differentiation strategy if several other carriers 
are also offering warehousing services. 
Therefore, one way to examine the potential 
effectiveness of bundling services together to 
achieve differentiation is to examine the number 
of competitors offering similar services at fixed 
points in time. Conceptually this is similar, but
not identical to, examining the diffusion process 
for a “new” bundle of logistics services. Diffusion 
is “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over 
time among the members of a social system” 
(Rogers, 1983).
The researchers treat carrier service bundling 
(motor carriage and warehousing) in a manner 
similar to a new service innovation. However, 
the results are not illustrated by constructing a 
diffusion curve and no specific decision variables 
are incorporated into the curve. A diffusion 
curve illustrates the total volume available in the 
market at fixed points in time (Bass, 1969). In 
contrast, the current research is interested in 
determining if bundling motor carriage and 
warehousing services together achieves 
differentiation by offering customers a unique 
bundle of services. The likelihood of achieving 
differentiation simply by bundling services 
together is low if several competitors are also 
successfully bundling transportation and 
warehousing services. Therefore, the current 
research constructs a graphical representation to 
examine the number of competitors (carriers) 
offering warehousing services a fixed points in 
time. This research will be consistent with past 
research (Oster, 1990) and allude to this type of 
graphical representation as an innovation path.
STUDY METHODOLOGY
Porter suggests successful differentiation 
typically requires additional company resources 
(Porter, 1980). For this reason the researchers 
chose to restrict the study to Class I LTL 
carriers. During the period of study a Class I 
LTL carrier was a carrier with annual revenues 
of $5 million or more. The researchers felt 
carriers with annual revenues of $5 million or 
more were the candidates most likely to have the 
resources available to achieve a successful 
expansion into warehousing.
A listing of all Class I LTL motor carriers was 
obtained from the National Motor Carrier 
Directory (1995). The Directory included 
information on the date each carrier was
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established and gave the name, position, and 
telephone number of the primary contact person 
for the organization. The researchers captured 
carriers operating in both a regulated and 
deregulated environment by restricting the study 
to companies operating continuously from 1980 
through the mid 1990’s.
Initially we identified 94 Class I LTL motor 
carriers who had been in continuous existence 
from 1980 to 1995. Five of the 94 earners 
specialized in express delivery and were 
subsequently dropped from further analysis. 
The researchers did not believe express delivery 
carriers were good subjects to examine because 
the types of services they offer are not 
comparable to most general freight carriers.
The remaining 89 carriers were contacted by 
telephone and asked to participate in the re­
search. The initial phone conversation explained 
the goals of the research and sought the name of 
the organization representative most concerned 
with a possible service expansion into ware­
housing. The initial conversations identified 
eleven carriers who were no longer performing 
LTL transportation and fifteen who were no 
longer independent firms because of mergers or 
takeovers. Finally, two firms refused to 
participate. After initial contact, the researchers 
had a total of 61 Class I LTL carriers who agreed 
to participate and provide information on their 
operations (See Table 1).
The survey instrument was reviewed by 
executives of two large LTL carriers to make 
sure terminology was appropriate. After 
refinement of the survey was complete, the 
contact person for each of the 61 firms was sent 
a copy of the survey and interviewed in a 
subsequent telephone call. Interviews to 
complete the survey typically lasted 10 to 20 
minutes. During the interview process several 
questions were asked about if and when the 
carrier expanded service offerings to include 
warehousing. For purposes of this research 
warehousing was defined as:
TABLE 1
DATA COLLECTION 
AND SURVEY SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Carriers contacted and asked to participate 89
Carriers no longer performing LTL carriage 
services
(ID
Carriers combined through merger or takeover (15)
Carriers refusing to participate (2)
Carriers participating in survey administration 61
A business entity with space and services 
available to serve customers in the re­
ceiving, storing, putaway, inventory 
control, order picking, and shipping of the 
customer’s goods for a designated period 
of time (Speh and Blomquist, 1988).
If the representative responded they did not offer 
any form of warehousing, only a short narrative 
section of the survey was administered. The 
purpose of the narrative section was to 
determine why the carrier elected to remain 
focused solely on transportation. In cases where 
the carrier did offer warehousing services to 
their customers, the entire survey was admini­
stered.
Included in the survey instrument were several 
additional questions designed to provide 
consistent criteria for carriers initially identi­
fying themselves as a warehouse provider. A 
firm was classified as offering warehousing if it 
met at least one of the following tests.
1) The firm or division falls under the Uniform 
Warehouse Receipts Act (UWRA) and issues 
a warehouse receipt when goods are received.
2) The firm typically stored goods for 72 hours 
or more.
3) The firm billed customers separately (or 
itemized a combined transportation/ware­
house bill) for warehousing services.
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4) The firm priced warehousing services 
separately from transportation.
5) The warehouse facility is physically separate 
from any terminal facilities.
In rare cases it was difficult to determine 
whether the carriers were providing emergency 
terminal storage or longer-term warehousing. In 
these cases the dialog of the conversation was 
continued until an informed determination could 
be made on the type of storage services offered 
by the carrier. In most cases carriers who met 
the definition of warehousing had separate 
warehouse and terminal facilities.
SUMMARY RESULTS
The following section summarizes key findings 
from the research.
Most motor carriers (42 of 61 = 69%) surveyed 
were classified as providers of warehousing (See 
Table 2). Of the 61 carriers participating in the 
research almost half (28 of 61 = 46%) chose to 
provide warehousing services by acquiring space 
and labor internally. Interestingly, only 31% (19 
of 61) of carriers surveyed indicated they do not 
offer any warehousing services to customers.
TABLE 2
CATEGORIZATION OF 
LTL CARRIER EXPANSION BEHAVIOR








Firms achieving expansion by providing the 
service internally
28 of 42 
(66.7%)
Firms achieving the expansion by providing 




Over the last several years, experts have urged 
businesses to contract with specialists unless the 
activity in question is a core competence of the
company. Companies can improve efficiency and 
productivity if they focus on their core 
competence or the activities that they do best. 
These types of activities are often provided 
internally and remain within the corporate walls 
if the company can do them more economically 
than outside specialists. Conversely, functions 
that are not considered to be core competencies 
are often outsourced. Interestingly, the current 
results indicate that roughly half of all Class I 
LTL carriers offering warehousing services have 
chosen to provide the additional services in- 
house. This treatment is consistent with recog­
nizing the service as a core competence. It 
appears management personnel of many Class I 
LTL carriers consider warehousing to be within 
the realm of their core competence.
Seventy-six percent (32 of 42) of the time product 
stored in the warehouse remained there over 7 
days and only 10% (4 of 42) of the time the 
product stayed less than 4 days. (See Table 3, 
Question #8). The results indicate motor 
carriers are making a clear distinction between 
cross-docking or temporary storage and 
legitimate warehousing services. Carriers are 
treating warehouse services as a separate 
logistics function. The two separate functions 
are then bundled together to furnish the 
customer multiple logistics services through one 
external provider.
Seventy-one percent (30 of 42) of carriers 
providing warehousing to customers identify the 
type of service they provide as being most similar 
to a contract warehouse situation (See Table 3). 
Another 24% (10 of 42) believe their services are 
most similar to a private warehouse facility. 
Only 2 of the 42 firms surveyed (5%) feel they 
are offering services most comparable to public 
warehousing facilities. Additionally over half the 
carriers (55%) cost and price warehousing 
services separately from transportation and 
another 38% consider warehousing costs in the 
overall price of services.
Warehousing appears to be a natural partner to 
trucking in the supply chain. Carriers typically 
pick up from, and deliver to, warehouses and
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TABLE 3
CARRIER CHARACTERIZATION OF WAREHOUSING SERVICES
Question # 7: Characterize which of the following types of warehousing you consider your firm’s services to be 




Question # 8: How long does product stored in your warehouse typically stay in the facility?
Fewer than 4 days 10%
4 to 7 days 14%
Over 7 days 76%
Question # 9: Indicate which of the following statements best describes how you consider the cost of warehousing 
in the pricing of overall services.
Warehouse cost is considered in the price of the overall service. 38%
Warehouse services are done primarily for customer service and the cost is not considered when pricing 
overall services.
7%
Warehouse service is costed and priced separately from motor carriage. 55%
often manage consolidation and cross-docking 
facilities. Warehousing is a major expense in the 
supply chain and shippers often use third parties 
to perform the function. Many LTL carriers 
already possess many of the materials handling 
and facility management skills which may easily 
transfer to warehouse management. Perhaps 
this is why many carriers participating in this 
research appear to view warehousing as a core 
competence. As a result, we expected shippers to 
be most comfortable with specialized and/or long­
term warehousing. Therefore, it is not sur­
prising that almost all of the carriers surveyed 
described their warehousing services to be most 
like a contract or private storage situation. They 
are attempting to deliver what the customer 
desires, and it is logical for most customers to 
prefer warehousing situations most similar to 
contract or private storage arrangements. 
Furthermore, the length of time product stays in 
storage indicates most customers are relatively
comfortable giving warehousing duties to their 
carriers. Most likely this is because the carriers 
were already familiar with the operations of 
their customers.
While outsourcing has typically been studied 
from the perspective of the firm buying the 
service, the service suppliers also have important 
decisions to make. Carriers have to determine if 
it makes sense to invest capital and other 
resources in a related business. Should the 
carrier turn to a warehouse specialist, provide 
the service internally, or turn down the customer 
request and stick to transportation? If these 
results are any indication, most carriers do not 
see declining the customer’s request for 
warehousing to be an option even though the 
service is a small contributor to total revenues. 
The primary decision faced by most carriers 
appears to be how to comply with their customer 
requests.
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Further investigation was made into the types of 
value-added services offered in the warehouse 
(See Table 4). The researchers chose to inquire 
about seven different value-added services 
common to warehouse operations. Results reveal 
at least half the carriers surveyed responded 
positively when asked about offering each of the 
seven value-added services. Perhaps carriers 
feel successful pursuit of a differentiation 
strategy requires more that merely offering 
warehousing facilities. Many carriers are 
responding by claiming to offer customized 
value-added services within the warehouse. 
Logistics activities are being redistributed 
throughout the supply chain, and long-time 
participants are redefining their roles and 
responsibilities. Major customers are asking for 
more integrated services and lower costs. While 
third-party logistics companies may still have 
the broadest offerings, the current research 
indicates that carriers are also moving beyond 
their traditional functions to provide customers 
with a number of value-added services.
Not surprisingly several carriers indicated they 
would like to see warehousing become a 
significant portion of total profit for the carrier. 
However, the percent of total revenue provided 
by expansion into warehousing remains small in 
most cases (See Table 5). Only 17% (7 of 42) of
carriers indicated total warehouse revenue 
exceeded 10% of total carrier revenue.
Internal vs. External Sourcing
Carriers were also asked about how they 
acquired the warehouse space necessary to 
complete the expansion into warehousing (See 
Table 5). The classification was determined 
based on the percentage of warehouse revenue 
gained from owner vs. independent facilities. If 
over 50% of a firm’s warehouse revenue was 
from owned facilities, the carrier was placed in 
the “self-providing” (internal provider) category. 
Carriers not meeting the above criteria were 
classified as buyers of warehouse services. 
Buyers of warehouse services were subsequently 
categorized as either alliance participants or 
purchasers of warehouse space. This categori­
zation was based on narrative information 
provided by each carrier during the telephone 
interview. For purposes of this study, a strategic 
alliance is the establishment of, and commitment 
to, a long-term interactive relationship where 
both parties benefit by sharing risks and 
resources (Ellram, 1991; Landeros and Monczka, 
1989). Based primarily on this definition, 
carriers were considered to participate in an 
alliance if: 1) the relationship was characterized 
by a long-term commitment and 2) significant
TABLE 4
CARRIER RESPONSE TO KEY WAREHOUSING ISSUES
Survey item # / Item of discussion % Yes % No
14a) The warehouse provider offers price marking of shipments 69.0 31.0
14b) The warehouse provider offers specialized packaging/repackaging of shipments 69.0 31.0
14c) The warehouse provider offers sorting or sequencing of shipments 92.9 7.1
14d) The warehouse provider offers labeling of shipments 69.0 31.0
14e) The warehouse provider offers sub-assembly assistance on shipments 50.0 50.0
14f) The warehouse provider offers bar coding or tracking 73.8 26.2
14g) The warehouse provider offers order picking in odd lots vs. full package 78.6 21.4
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TABLE 5
REVENUE PRODUCED (BY METHOD OF ACQUIRING WAREHOUSING SPACE)
Question # 15: Estimate the percentage of revenue provided by offering warehousing services.
More than 50% 2%
More than 30% and up to 50% 5%
More than 10% and up to 30% 10%
Less than 10% 83%
Question # 17a (For carriers using internal expansion to acquire warehouse space): Estimate the percentage of 
warehousing revenue generated by offering warehousing services by providing the service internally.
More than 85% and up to 100% (20 of 28) = 71%
More than 70% and up to 85% (5 of 28) = 18%
Less than 70% (3 of 28) = 11%
Question # 17b (For carriers using a strategic alliance or partnership to acquire warehouse space): Estimate the 
percentage of warehousing revenue generated by offering warehousing services by providing the service 
through a strategic alliance or partnership arrangement.
More than 85% and up to 100% (8 of 11) = 73%
More than 70% and up to 85% (2 of 11)= 18%
Less than 70% (1 of 11) = 9%
Question # 17c (For carriers using a purchase agreement to acquire warehouse space): Estimate the percentage of 
warehousing revenue generted by offering warehousing services by purchasing the warehouse space.
More than 85% and up to 100% (2 of 3) = 67%
More than 70% and up to 85% (1 of 3) = 33%
Less than 25 (0 of 3) = 0%
amounts of resources were shared between the 
two partners. Carriers not meeting this criteria 
were placed in the “purchase” category.
Of the 42 carriers providing warehousing 
services, two-thirds (28 of 42) acquired the 
needed warehouse space internally (See Table 2), 
again consistent with treating warehousing as a 
core competence. The remaining 14 carriers 
looked for outside assistance to acquire the 
needed warehouse space. Eleven of these 
entities formed an alliance or partnership with 
another company and only three purchased the 
warehouse space via an arms-length agreement.
Table 5 further analyzes warehousing revenues 
by examining revenue generated by each method 
(internal, strategic alliance/partnership, and 
external).
When carriers are faced with a make/buy 
decision for warehousing, they seem to operate 
much like their shipper customers. Larger 
carriers appear to be more likely to offer 
warehousing from their own buildings and with 
their own employees. Carriers appear to view 
warehousing as a core competence and tend to 
provide the service internally. This pattern 
appears consistent with past research (Maltz,
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1994) which found as specialization increases in 
a private warehousing situation, providers opt to 
supply the service internally. Perhaps an 
increase in specialization infers a core 
competence and, as a result, is more likely to be 
handled internally. One could argue this may be 
surprising since carriers are likely to be very 
knowledgeable about the operations of any 
potential external warehouse provider. 
However, one could also argue this knowledge 
and expertise makes the carrier a difficult 
customer for any potential warehouse provider. 
Perhaps carriers are very discriminating 
customers when examining the warehousing 
operations of a potential partner and instead 
elect to provide the warehousing services 
themselves.
Growth in carrier expansion rates was also 
examined. Respondents were asked to estimate 
when the firm they represent first began to offer 
warehousing services. Table 6 summarizes the 
results. The results show consistent growth in 
the number of carriers providing warehousing 
since 1980 (See Column 2 of Table 6). The 
percent of carriers in the marketplace who have 
expanded services to provide warehousing has 
also experienced growth since deregulation (See 
Column 4 of Table 6). A graphical representa­
tion of the percent of carriers in the marketplace 
providing warehousing is also shown (See Figure 
1). The graph illustrates the dramatic rise in 
warehouse service offerings by carriers. Carrier 
expansion into warehousing has experienced 
healthy growth since deregulation of the 
industry in 1980. However, the most dramatic 
growth in service expansion rates has occurred 
since 1990.
CONCLUSIONS
This research focuses on gaining insight into 
several key topics. First, carrier expansion 
habits are not well understood. This research 
examines the number of carriers expanding 
service offerings to include warehousing. 
Second, logistics service providers have many 
decisions to make about the types of services
made available to customers. Specific services 
offered in the current marketplace are identified. 
Third, suppliers must explore how to best 
acquire the resources needed to achieve a service 
line expansion. Insight is gained into how 
various carriers acquire warehouse space. 
Fourth, growth rates of service bundling 
practices by carriers since deregulation is 
examined to see if bundling strategies are being 
adopted. This exploratory research should 
interest both shippers looking to reduce their 
supply base and carriers looking to augment 
market share.
Over two-thirds of the Class I LTL carriers that 
have survived deregulation appear to offer some 
form of warehousing services. LTL carriers 
appear to be increasing their roles in the supply 
chain which is likely to be good news for 
customers. As carriers continue to expand 
offerings, customers interested in obtaining 
multiple services from select carriers will have 
sufficient availability in the third-party logistics 
market.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
From the provider perspective, the results 
indicate it is unlikely that merely expanding 
service offerings to include an additional logistics 
function will allow the carrier to achieve 
differentiation. Successful differentiation is 
likely to require highly specialized, customized 
services uniquely tailored to the needs of each 
customer. However, offering highly specialized 
services to each customer may add to the 
complexity of carrier operations by requiring a 
deviation from the core competency of 
transportation. As a result, offering highly 
customized services may not always be advisable 
and needs to be investigated further.
Many types of value-added services are offered 
by carriers expanding into the warehousing 
market. In the period immediately subsequent 
to deregulation, many carriers began offering 
customized services to attract and retain 
customers. This was typically done by providing
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TABLE 6
TIMING OF MOTOR CARRIER EXPANSION INTO WAREHOUSING SERVICES





# of Firms in Existence
Col #4
% of Firms Offering Warehousing
1950 1 26 1 of 26 = 3.84%
1956 2 35 2 of 35 = 5.71%
1962 3 45 3 of 45 = 6.67%
1967 4 51 4 of 51 = 7.84%
1975 5 55 5 of 55 = 9.09%
1980 6 61 6 of 61 =9.84%
1982 7 61 7 of 61 = 11.48%
1984 8 61 8 of 61 = 13.11%
1985 10 61 10 of 61 = 16.40%
1987 12 61 12 of 61 = 19.67%
1988 15 61 15 of 61 = 24.60%
1989 17 61 17 of 61 = 27.87%
1990 19 61 19 of 61 = 31.15%
1991 26 61 26 of 61 = 42.62%
1992 30 61 30 of 61 = 49.18%
1993 35 61 35 of 61 = 57.38%
1994 40 61 40 of 61 = 65.57%
1995 42 61 42 of 61 = 68.85%
FIGURE 1
CLASS I LTL CARRIERS 
EXPANSION INTO WAREHOUSING
customers a wider array of services (Pickett and 
Kletke, 1984; Rakowski, 1981) or expanding to 
include more innovative services (Harper, 1983, 
Harper, 1982). Results of the current research 
indicates these trends continue in the 1990’s. 
Many logistics practitioners interviewed during 
the current study indicated they feel pressure 
from customers to offer multiple logistics 
services uniquely tailored to the needs of each 
customer. Carriers appear to be responding by 
making the commitment to expand offerings to 
customers and provide specific, customized 
services.
Fall 2000 11
The sensitivity to current market trends may be 
an indication that carriers are moving toward a 
strategy of providing integrated logistics services 
to their customers. However, the intangible 
nature of services and diversity of customer 
demands make it very difficult to arrive at an 
optimal level of service offerings. As a result, 
many study participants indicated a difficulty 
determining which expanded service offerings to 
pursue to remain competitive, retain acceptable 
customer service levels, and maintain or increase 
market share.
How was the expansion achieved by carriers? It 
should be noted that 26% of the Class I LTL 
carriers offering warehousing services use a 
strategic alliance-type relationship with an 
external provider to achieve the service 
expansion. This number alone is significant 
enough to justify further consideration by carrier 
managers. However, the researchers suspect the 
number of carriers expanding by entering into a 
strategic alliance-type relationship with an 
external entity is much higher among smaller 
carriers. Past research (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
indicates carrier size is positively correlated with 
providing warehouse facilities internally.
Class I LTL carriers are larger carriers with 
significant resources. As a result, many of the 
carriers (66.7%) in the current study expanded 
by investing resources in internal assets and 
providing the additional service “in-house.” 
However, in addition to Class I LTL carriers, 
hundreds of smaller carriers (Class II and III) 
feel the pressure to expand service offerings to 
customers. Many of these carriers may not have 
the resources to expand internally.
Many smaller carriers must examine other 
approaches to providing warehousing services to 
their customers. One alternative is to have the 
carrier act as lead integrated service provider. 
The lead provider (carrier) then determines the 
best way to provide the additional services 
required by their customer. Many smaller LTL 
carriers electing to pursue a differentiation 
strategy may find participation in a strategic
alliance allows them the opportunity to provide 
additional value-added services.
Successful examples of beneficial and profitable 
strategic alliance-type relationships within the 
logistics industry can already be identified (Dyer 
et al., 1998, Lemmink et al., 1996; Rogers and 
Daugherty, 1995). A clear trend of pursuing a 
differentiation strategy by entering into a 
strategic alliance-type relationship with an 
external logistics provider is becoming apparent. 
However, before an alliance-type relationship 
can be successfully implemented, the partners 
must move away from treating business 
associates as adversaries; a dramatic contrast to 
past business practices which have traditionally 
viewed other entities as competitors.
Growth rates of service bundling practices are on 
the rise. Prior to deregulation less than 10% of 
carriers offered any type of warehousing 
services. However, since deregulation intro­
duced competition into the market and forced 
carriers to compete for customers, service 
expansion into warehousing has exploded. 
Currently over two-thirds of all Class I LTL 
general freight motor carriers surveyed offer 
some form of warehousing services. While 
sufficient carrier growth into warehousing can be 
detected from 1980 to 1990, the most dramatic 
growth has occurred since 1990 (See Table 5 and 
Figure 1). Stiff competition from other carriers 
coupled with sophisticated and demanding 
customers has either enticed or forced carriers to 
expand offerings. Carriers are attempting to 
remain competitive in part by expanding services 
available and customizing those services.
Many shippers continue to reduce their supplier 
bases. Class I LTL carriers appear to be 
responding to the trend by offering more services 
and moving towards becoming integrated 
logistics providers. If carriers can remain 
sensitive to customer demands in the future, 
perhaps they will not only be able to provide 
multiple logistics services but will be able to 
accommodate customer demands throughout the 
entire supply chain. Understanding the current
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conditions of the evolving marketplace is critical 
to improving shipper and carrier performance 
levels and warrants in-depth investigation.
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are many possible extensions to the 
current research. This research focuses entirely 
on Class I LTL carriers expanding to provide 
warehousing. First, the population of Class I 
LTL motor carriers in business prior to 1980 and 
as of the end of 1995 could be expanded to 
include all Class I LTL carriers currently in 
operation. The research could also be expanded 
to include smaller LTL carriers or carriers in the 
TL segment of the industry.
Second, transportation and warehousing are just 
two of the many functions which could be 
studied. A similar methodology could be applied 
to studying carriers providing services other 
than warehousing (e.g., inventory control, order 
processing, materials handling, or packaging). 
Replication of this methodology to study the
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bundling of other services could help to better 
understand the strategic orientation of carriers.
Third, customers have many choices when 
outsourcing logistics functions. Many successful 
third-party logistics providers practice bundling 
and claim to customize services. Therefore, future 
research should not be limited to motor carriers 
expanding services. The scope should be expanded 
to include a diverse sample of external providers.
Fourth, this research focuses on United States 
firms. Companies in different regions must be 
sensitive to their operating environment if they 
are to remain competitive. A global examination 
of third-party logistics service providers could 
contribute additional insight into current global 
outsourcing practices.
Fifth, relatively little research has focused on the 
provider portion of logistics services. Most 
research in the third-party logistics market 
focuses on demand for services. As a result, 
supply-side research into logistics outsourcing is 
critically needed.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE FUNCTIONAL ORIENTATION OF 
SENIOR MANAGERS AND SERVICE 
QUALITY IN LTL MOTOR CARRIERS
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ABSTRACT
This study utilizes data envelopment analysis to examine the relationship between the 
functional heterogeneity of senior LTL motor carrier managers’ departmental positions and 
the relative efficiency of their companies in the production of quality customer service. Three 
measures from the Quest for Quality annual survey are utilized to measure customer 
satisfaction: on-time performance, value, and customer service.
It is shown that data envelopment analysis can be used to assist LTL motor carriers in 
benchmarking the configuration of their managerial hierarchies against their peers in order 
to achieve the goal of customer satisfaction. The results of the present study confirm that 
senior level managers in operations and marketing-oriented functions have become more 
prevalent in the current deregulated operating environment. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that an optimal balance between senior level managers in market-oriented functions 
and those in operations-oriented functions does exist when the targeted objective is customer 
satisfaction. The study also demonstrates that most LTL motor carriers were relatively 
inefficient in their configuration of these senior level managers.
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 
1980, researchers have often attempted to 
ascertain the determinants of the freight carrier 
selection process. This issue has assumed
greater urgency of late as reflected by the results 
of a joint study by the University of Tennessee, 
Mercer Management Consulting, and Ernst & 
Young, LLP (Holcomb and Manrodt, 2000) which 
found that shippers in the study had made a 
conscious effort to reduce the number of carriers
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used. Many studies have examined the overall 
quality of service and its relationship to costs. 
Specifically, McGinnis (1990) reviewed empirical 
studies done during the 1970's and 1980's to 
address the relative importance of service and 
cost as determinants of the transportation choice 
decision and whether this choice changed after 
deregulation. It was found for the periods before 
and after deregulation that cost was a major 
factor only after service objectives were met.1 
Taylor and Meinert (2000) state that even though 
low cost was important, it was not the only 
concern of shippers. Lambert, et al. (1993) also 
found that greater emphasis on the quality of 
service delivered was more important to shippers 
than low rates. D’Aveni (1995) has noted that as 
competition increases, the value (ratio of quality 
to cost) offered by firms causes customers to 
move toward the firm offering the higher value at 
a given price. Holcomb and Manrodt (2000) 
further found that carriers must better under­
stand the needs of their customers in order to 
provide this greater value. In order to offer low 
prices, companies continuously search for ways 
to decrease operating costs without sacrificing 
the quality their customers expect. Liu (1993) 
developed an equilibrium model taking the 
service quality levels as given with the carriers 
competing by setting rates. It was found that 
only a small number of competing carriers could 
coexist in a market of intense competition where 
shippers demand high service quality yet want to 
control costs. Additionally, Allen and Liu (1995) 
found that excluding service quality measures 
from the cost estimation functions 
underestimates scale economies.
Wisner and Lewis (1996) examined the quality 
issue from the carrier’s perspective in a survey of 
transportation company members of the 
American Society of Transportation and Logi­
stics. They found that quality of service is also a 
concern of the carriers. The survey found that 
many companies have implemented formal 
quality improvement programs and appear to be 
committed to quality improvement.
Crosby (1979) defines quality as “conformance to 
requirements.” The problem with this definition 
is that the
. . . customer often perceives the quality 
of the intangible service differently than 
the provider does. It is this difference in 
perception of service that creates 
polarization in defining and satisfying 
transportation customers . . . (Crosby, 
1979, p. 63).
Parasuraman, et al. (1985) further state that 
consumers use their expectations, coupled with 
perception of performance, to measure the 
quality of service delivered.
Many variables have been used to measure 
quality. In a review of the marketing literature, 
Parasuraman, et al. (1985) provide some insight 
into service quality determinants. They found the 
following determinants of service quality: 
reliability, responsiveness, competence, access, 
courtesy, communication, credibility, security, 
understanding of the customer and tangible 
measures. The tangible measures include 
physical facilities, equipment and per-sonnel. 
Lambert, et al. (1993) found that 16 of the 18 
variables rated most important by their survey 
respondents were service related. The four 
variables ranked highest were quality of dispatch 
personnel, on-time pickups, on-time deliveries, 
and competitive rates. Allen and Liu (1995) used 
a service index and convenience index from 
Distribution magazine’s annual “Quest for 
Quality Survey.” Liu (1993) used transit time as 
a proxy for service quality. Chow and Poist 
(1984) used seven categories of overall service 
quality in their survey of transportation choice 
decision makers. They found that a significant 
number of decision makers do not record the 
carrier attributes which are rated as highly 
important in the carrier selection decision. 
However, the factors that were recorded, either 
formally or informally, related to rates, claims, 
transit time, equipment, and operations.
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McGinnis (1989) identified the following five 
service variables: reliability, transit time, specific 
shipper needs, over, short, or damaged freight, 
and specific carrier characteristics.
This study investigates the relationship between 
the level of customer-perceived quality and the 
functional orientation of senior managers in LTL 
companies. Early work done by Dearborn and 
Simon (1958) is extensively cited in the literature 
as providing evidence that managerial cognition 
is influenced by their functional experience. A 
group of 23 executives, all employed by the same 
large manufacturing firm and enrolled in a 
company sponsored executive training program 
were asked to read a standard policy case. 
Dearborn and Simon collected brief statements 
from these executives about the most important 
problem they perceived in the case. An analysis 
of these statements allowed them to relate the 
function from which a particular manager came 
and the type of problem identified. From this 
they concluded that executives are more focused 
on those items that specifically relate to their job 
functions.
Several criticisms can be directed at this study. 
The sample size was small and all the managers 
were attending an executive training program. 
Such programs tend to stress the importance of 
developing general management perspectives. 
Additionally, all participants were from the same 
firm. Most notably, the instructions given to the 
participants were interpreted inconsistently. 
They were asked to note the most important 
problem, but, in fact, Dearborn and Simon note 
that several listed up to three problems.
Walsh (1988) sought to extend the work of 
Dearborn and Simon. Utilizing the notion that 
managers’ belief structures are derived from 
their experience and that past functional, 
organizational, and industry experiences may be 
influential in shaping belief structures, he sought 
to study the effect of a manager’s belief structure 
on the problem identification process. In his 
study Walsh used 121 mid-career managers who 
were enrolled in a two-year, part-time executive 
masters degree program at a large university.
In the first part of the experiment, each manager 
was given a randomly ordered deck of 50 cards. 
Each card contained a factor broadly related to 
the success of an organization. Walsh used three 
main functional groupings in the study. These 
were human relations, accounting/finance and 
marketing. The managers were asked to sort the 
cards into piles of related factors and to rank the 
importance of these piles. In the second part of 
the experiment, the managers were given the 
three-page case history and they were asked to 
identify the problem or problems facing the 
company. This case was deliberately designed to 
contain an ill-structured situation with 
associated issues that spanned a number of 
functional domains.
The results of both parts of the experiment stand 
in interesting contrast to the Dearborn and 
Simon study. Walsh found that 49 percent of the 
managers in his sample had a “generalist” 
orientation. However, as with the Dearborn and 
Simon study, several problems have been noted. 
Some of the factors presented on the cards, which 
were purportedly related to causing organization 
success, could also be regarded as measures of 
success. Additionally, the list of factors seemed 
to contain many factors that could not clearly be 
associated with any particular function. Finally, 
as with the Dearborn and Simon study, the 
sample was drawn from an executive training- 
type program.
A study undertaken by Nystrom (1991) utilized 
a sample of 73 alumni of an executive MBA 
program. Thus, there was the inherent limita­
tion noted above with regard to the two earlier 
studies. Using a framework similar to Dess and 
Davis (1984), Nystrom derived a list of generic 
competitive methods based on Porter’s competi­
tive strategies. Participants were asked to rate 
how important particular competitive methods 
were to their company’s overall strategy. The 
results of this experiment were twofold. First, 
managers of production and finance departments 
tended to perceive competitive methods 
associated with a low-cost strategy as being more 
important than their counterparts in marketing 
and R&D departments. Second, managers of
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marketing and R&D departments tended to 
perceive those competitive methods associated 
with a product-differentiation strategy as being 
more important than their counterparts in 
production and finance departments.
Bowman and Daniels (1995) undertook a study 
utilizing a more representative sample of 
managers (not based on an association with an 
executive development program) and a larger 
sample size. Additionally, they did not use the 
case-based approach of the Dearborn and Simon 
and Walsh studies. The sample used in this 
study was 319 managers from 42 different 
strategic business units in the United Kingdom. 
Bowman and Daniels, utilizing the methodology 
employed by Nystrom, found several statistically 
significant results. First, production/operations 
managers rated cost control priorities higher 
than managers in finance/accounting, sales/ 
marketing, or general management. Second, 
sales/marketing managers rated differentiation 
priorities higher than all other managers. Third, 
finance/accounting and sales/marketing 
managers rated cost control priorities lower than 
the other management groups. Finally, finance/ 
accounting and production/operations managers 
rated differentiation priorities lower than other 
managers.
Corsi, Grimm and Feitler (1992) examine the 
impact of deregulation on LTL motor carriers 
with regard to size, structure, and organization. 
Of particular relevance to the present study is 
their hypothesis that the deregulated environ­
ment is one where managerial skills relating to 
marketing and product development are 
perceived as having greater value than those 
focused on accounting and production. 
Marketing includes issues of pricing and sales. 
They utilized a matched sample of 96 LTL motor 
carriers for 1977 and 1987. They examined the 
job titles of senior managers and identified 
eleven functional managerial categories. These 
categories were grouped into the three subgroups 
of market-oriented, regulatory-oriented, and 
other functions. Job titles included in the 
market-oriented category were marketing, 
rates/tariffs, and finance/comptroller while those
in the regulatory-oriented category were law, 
claims, and traffic management. All other job 
titles were included in the “other” category. 
Their results suggest a statistically significant 
change in the distribution of senior managers 
among the three subgroups with the number of 
managers in market-oriented functions 
increasing at the expense of regulatory-oriented 
functions.
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
This study utilizes the annual Quest for Quality 
survey which is the most extensive research 
study conducted to evaluate and measure 
transportation providers in the logistics industry. 
It also attempts to determine the relevant 
criteria for customers in their selection of a 
particular type of carrier. Results from the last 
several years of surveys have strongly indicated 
that the three most important attributes in 
evaluating LTL carriers are on-time 
performance, value and customer service. The 
highest rated critical category was on-time 
performance, being seen as even more important 
than price. Furthermore, when LTL carriers 
arrive on schedule, shipping operations run 
smoothly and there are fewer backups at loading 
docks.
Such performance benchmarks have become 
particularly important for LTLs in the last few 
years. Comments provided by respondents to the 
survey over the period 1993 to 1997 suggest a 
trend on the part of LTL buyers to reduce the 
number of carriers with whom they have working 
relationships. This places a greater emphasis on 
monitoring contracts and service and switching 
carriers if necessary.
Clearly, the value-added activities noted above 
have become strategic priorities for LTL carriers. 
At the same time, the prioritization of the 
activities is a function of the perceptions of top- 
level managers. In fact, it has been suggested 
that the composition of the functional orientation 
of senior managers should be actively managed 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Abernathy, 1980). 
In this spirit, this study investigates the
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relationship between the functional orientation 
of top level managers and the ability of LTL 
carriers to achieve relatively superior 
performance with regard to the three measures 
of on-time performance, value and customer 
service.
The current study uses data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to investigate the relationship 
between the functional heterogeneity of senior 
LTL motor carrier managers’ departmental 
positions and the relative efficiency of their 
companies in the production of quality customer 
service. Drawing upon the results of the previous 
studies, it is argued that the functional back­
ground of senior managers will influence the 
motor carriers’ overall choice of competitive stra­
tegies as defined by Porter. Thus, the results of 
the analysis will also suggest whether or not a 
motor carrier’s choices with regard to competitive 
strategies are aligned with their ability to 
provide quality customer service. A statistical 
analysis is also undertaken to examine the 
relationship between a motor carrier’s relative 
efficiency with regard to the production of 
customer service and profitability.
The next section describes the data used in the 
analysis. An explanation of the DEA methodo­
logy follows along with a discussion and 
evaluation of the results.
DATA COLLECTION
Two years of data are included in this study: 
1993 and 1997. These years represent end-points 
of a five-year period with the most complete set 
of necessary data. The carriers used in this study 
are those with complete information regarding 
the functional affiliations of senior managers. 
This information is obtained from the Official 
Motor Carrier Directory for the years 1993 and 
1997. The quality of customer service scores is 
obtained from the Quest for Quality surveys. A 
final sample of 32 LTL motor carriers (64 
observations) for the years 1993 and 1997 is 
obtained that meets the above criteria.
The input data variables used in this study relate 
to the functional categories of senior managers 
and is similar to those of the Corsi, Grimm, and 
Feitler (1992) study: financial, maintenance or 
safety, marketing, and operations. The financial- 
oriented category includes such activity titles as 
rates/tariffs, finance, and comptroller. The 
marketing-oriented group includes marketing, 
sales and customer relations. The maintenance/ 
safety category includes maintenance and safety 
titles. The operations-oriented category includes 
operations and traffic management. All other 
activity titles are placed in the “other” category 
and are not used in this study. The percentages 
of total senior managers for each of the four 
categories are the input variables. Panel A of 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the input 
variables. The average percent of senior man­
agers with a maintenance or safety title is lowest 
(8%). In fact, 26 of the 64 observations (41%) 
employ no senior managers with maintenance or 
safety titles. On average, the companies employ 
more senior managers with operation-oriented 
titles than any other title (22%).
The outputs in this study are the customer 
service measures of three dimensions of quality 
from the Quest for Quality survey: on-time 
performance, value, and customer service. 
Carriers are rated on a three-point scale (3 = 
outstanding; 2 = average; 1= poor) that is then 
averaged and reported in the survey results. The 
on-time performance variable measures a 
carrier’s performance with regard to pickup and 
delivery, consistent and dependable schedules 
and transit times, and equipment availability. 
The value variable measures a carrier’s perfor­
mance with regard to the competitiveness of 
rates with other carriers offering the same 
service, the commensurability of pricing to the 
service level required by the customer, and the 
simplicity of rates. Customer service measures 
a carrier’s performance with regard to the 
prompt settlement of claims, the ability to trace 
and expedite shipments, and the prompt and 
courteous solution of problems. Minimum values 
for on-time performance and customer service
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DATA VARIABLES 
PANEL A - INPUT VARIABLES®
Financial Titles Maintenance/ Safety Titles Marketing Titles Operations Titles
Average 15.4% 8.0% 20.9% 22.2%
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maximum 40.0 22.2 50.0 50.0
Median 14.3 7.4 20.0 20.0
PANEL B - OUTPUT VARIABLES1’
On-Time Performance Value Customer Service
Average 2.257 2.129 2.161
Minimum 1.880 1.870 1.790
Maximum 2.600 2.440 2.530
Median 2.260 2.130 2.155
“Data are obtained from the Official Motor Carrier Directory. These data are accumulated over the two-year period of the
study.
bData are obtained from Distribution magazine’s annual “Quest for Quality Survey.” The ratings are based on a three-point
scale (3 = outstanding; 2 = average; 1 = poor).
are attributable to DiSalvo-1993, while Fredrick­
son Motor Express-1997 received the minimum 
score for the value variable. American Freight- 
ways-1993 is tied with Wilson Trucking-1997 for 
the maximum value for on-time performance. 
Wilson Trucking-1997 also has the maximum 
values for customer service. Pitt Ohio Express- 
1993 earns the maximum for the value variable.
DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
The methodology employed in this study is data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). This methodology 
is used to compare the relative efficiencies of 
decision-making units (DMUs). The criterion for 
efficiency is that used in traditional micro- 
economic analysis with regard to production 
plans. A production plan is efficient if there is no 
way to produce more output with the same 
inputs or to produce the same output with fewer 
inputs.
DEA differs from standard econometric metho­
dology in its implementation of the efficiency 
criteria noted above. The traditional parametric 
production function uses a specific pre-defined 
functional form that is assumed to apply to each 
DMU. DEA is a nonparametric technique that 
makes no assumptions about the form of the 
production function and instead optimizes the 
performance measure of each DMU. An empirical 
best practice production frontier is thus 
estimated from the actual, observed inputs and 
outputs of individual DMUs. This frontier 
replicates the behavior of individual units rather 
than that of the average sample estimate of 
parametric production functions. A DMU is 
therefore considered efficient when comparisons 
with other units indicate no inefficiency in the 
utilization of inputs and outputs, as measured by 
its position relative to the efficient production 
frontier. In other words, the objective of DEA is 
to minimize total waste in both the inputs and
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the outputs. Another important aspect of DEA is 
that it allows the efficiency scores to be 
independent of the units of measurement for the 
data, i.e., units-invariant.
Three sets of information are used in the 
analyses: input, output, and descriptive 
measures. Input measures represent minimizing 
goals, such as minimizing the number of 
marketing executives and/or minimizing the 
number of maintenance executives. Output 
measures represent maximizing goals such as 
maximizing customer service. Descriptive 
measures represent variables used to further 
discriminate between efficient and non-efficient 
observations.
The analysis in this study employs the input 
oriented model since the objective of this 
research is to determine whether the functional 
orientation of managers affects the quality of 
customer service. In the case of the input 
oriented model, one set of variables, inputs, takes 
priority over the output variables. This model 
seeks to minimize the inputs utilized. The 
implicit underlying premise in such an 
orientation is that the primary objective of the 
motor earner under evaluation is to gain 
efficiency by reducing excess input utilization 
while continuing to operate with the current 
technology mix (reflected in actual input ratios). 
A measure of efficiency for the input oriented 
model as defined in Chames et al. (1978) is l. 
This efficiency measure is the multiple of the 
input vector that would yield the current level of 
output. A most desirable aspect of the input- 
oriented model is that, because it measures 
inefficiency in terms of proportional changes of 
inputs, it allows a motor carrier to be evaluated 
with respect to a best practice motor carrier that 
is most similar to it in terms of input mix. It 
should be noted that an efficient observation will 
have an efficiency measure, l, of 1.000.
The efficiency measure, l, conveys information 
with regard to managerial policy. Consider the 
following case. Suppose Motor Carrier A has a 
peer group of motor carriers that have compara­
tively efficient percent of senior managers with 
specific functional titles allowing them to achieve 
the levels of output of Motor Carrier A more 
efficiently. If z"is very small, then the mix of 
senior managers of Motor Carrier A is really off 
the mark and attention should be focused on 
shifting the input senior manager mix. If, on the 
other hand, Ms close to 1.000, then the motor 
carrier could remain with its current senior 
manager mix and achieve the same levels of 
output with a small scaling down. Thus, 
utilization of the input oriented model allows the 
researcher to develop assessment measures of 
inefficiency and to also evaluate the efficacy of 
managerial strategies.
RESULTS
Table 2 presents a list of the values for the input 
oriented efficiency score, i, for each observation, 
with summary statistics shown in Table 3. As 
shown in Panel A of Table 3, the overall values 
for l range from 0.288 to 1.000 (efficient). The 
minimum value is attributable to G.I. Trucking- 
1993. A value of 0.288 for l implies that the 
carrier in question could have produced its 
current level of customer perceived quality and, 
at the same time, proportionally reduced all 
inputs in the process by 71.2 percent. Only two 
companies are considered efficient for both years: 
American Freightways, and Ward Trucking. 
Eighteen companies show an increase in 
efficiency from 1993 to 1997 with ten of those 
companies improving their input mix over the 
period to attain an efficiency measure of 1.000 in 
1997. Twelve companies show a decrease in 
efficiency with eight companies actually starting 
in 1993 with an efficiency measure of 1.000 and 





AAA Cooper Transportation 1993 1.000
AAA Cooper Transportation 1997 0.591
ABF Freight Systems 1993 0.510
ABF Freight Systems 1997 0.578
American Freightways 1993 1.000
American Freightways 1997 1.000
ANR Advance 1993 0.380
ANR Advance 1997 0.469
A-P-A Transport 1993 0.818
A-P-A Transport 1997 1.000
Averitt Express 1993 1.000
Averitt Express 1997 0.510
Con-Way Central Express 1993 0.934
Con-Way Central Express 1997 0.745
Con-Way Western Express 1993 0.603
Con-Way Western Express 1997 1.000
Di Salvo 1993 0.843
Di Salvo 1997 1.000
Estes Express 1993 0.472
Estes Express 1997 0.567
Fredrickson Motor Express 1993 1.000
Fredrickson Motor Express 1997 0.368
G.I. Trucking 1993 0.288
G.I. Trucking 1997 0.335
Lynden Transport 1993 0.463
Lynden Transport 1997 1.000
Motor Cargo 1993 0.570
Motor Cargo 1997 0.626
NationsWay (NW Transport) 1993 0.675
NationsWay (NW Transport) 1997 0.476
New England Motor Freight 1993 0.972
New England Motor Freight 1997 1.000
Carrier Year l
Old Dominion Freight Lines 1993 0.370
Old Dominion Freight Lines 1997 0.480
Overnite Transportation 1993 0.688
Overnite Transportation 1997 0.743
Pitt Ohio Express 1993 1.000
Pitt Ohio Express 1997 0.623
Preston Trucking Co. 1993 1.000
Preston Trucking Co. 1997 0.598
Roadway Express 1993 0.716
Roadway Express 1997 0.631
Saia Motor Freight 1993 1.000
Saia Motor Freight 1997 0.608
Southeastern Freight Lines 1993 0.812
Southeastern Freight Lines 1997 1.000
USF Bestway (TNT Bestway) 1993 0.601
USF Bestway (TNT Bestway) 1997 0.477
USF Holland (TNT Holland Motor 1993 0.787
USF Holland (TNT Holland 1997 1.000
USF Red Star 1993 1.000
USF Red Star 1997 0.549
USF Reddaway (TNT Reddaway) 1993 0.873
USF Reddaway (TNT 1997 1.000
Viking Freight System 1993 0.896
Viking Freight System 1997 1.000
Ward Trucking 1993 1.000
Ward Trucking 1997 1.000
Watkins Motor Lines 1993 1.000
Watkins Motor Lines 1997 0.947
Wilson Trucking 1993 0.652
Wilson Trucking 1997 1.000
Yellow Freight System 1993 0.811
Yellow Freight S^stem^ 1997 0.832
a ns the input-oriented efficiency score. A score of 1.000 means that the observation has no inefficiency. Efficient 
observations are shown in bold.
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TABLE 3















a l is the input-oriented efficiency score. A score of 1.000 
means that the observation has no inefficiency.
The number of observations with an efficiency 
score of 1.000 is 22, leaving the remaining 42 
observations as relatively inefficient. Although 
42 observations are not considered efficient, it is 
important to consider the range of values within 
this group. Panel B of Table 3 presents summary 
information for l for the inefficient observations 
only. As previously stated, G.I. Trucking-1993 
has the lowest value for l (0.288); New England 
Motor Freight-1993 attains the maximum value 
of 0.972. The average value for l is 0.631. An 
examination of the quartiles for l reveals that 
the second quartile ranges from 0.510 to 0.603; 
the third quartile ranges from 0.608 to 0.787; and 
the fourth quartile ranges from 0.812 to 0.972. 
Some of the observations in the fourth quartile 
may be considered somewhat efficient in terms of 
having managers with the appropriate functional 
backgrounds necessary to produce high quality 
customer service. These results suggest that
some companies correctly perceived the optimal 
training background needed to provide the level 
of service quality demanded by their customers.
Table 4 displays the amount of inefficiency for all 
observations and all variables. The amount of 
inefficiency compares the actual value with a 
projected efficient value for the specific 
observation. A value of 0.000 for the amount of 
inefficiency means that the actual input value 
equals the optimally calculated projected value. 
Input inefficiencies carry a negative sign indi­
cating the necessary reduction for efficient 
operation. An examination of the amount of 
inefficiency for the individual input variables can 
be used to explain the observed range of values 
for l. For all variables, the efficient observations 
have the projected value equal to the actual 
value so the following will discuss only the 
results for the inefficient observations.
Three of the 42 inefficient observations operate 
with the actual percent of managers with 
financial backgrounds equal to the projected 
percent; 5 (2) observations have the actual equal 
to the optimally projected percent of marketing 
(operations) background; and 14 observations 
have the actual equal to the optimally projected 
percent of maintenance/safety title.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the 
amount of the input inefficiencies for the 
inefficient observations only. Throughout the 
period of the study, the average level of 
inefficiency is 0.067 for the financial title, 0.032 
for maintenance/safety, 0.077 for marketing title, 
and 0.091 for operations. All titles achieve the 
minimum amount of inefficiency (0.000). The 
highest value for the amount of inefficiency 
(-0.286) is denoted by a negative sign and occurs 
in the operations title. In examining the number 
of times that each title has the largest amount of 
inefficiency, it is noted that 43% of the 
observations are for the operations title, 28% are 
for the marketing title, 19% are for the financial 
title, and 10% are for the maintenance/safety 
title. This suggests that observations with 











AAA Cooper Transportation 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AAA Cooper Transportation 1997 -0.068 0.000 -0.068 -0.116
ABF Freight Systems 1993 -0.071 -0.036 -0.143 ’ -0.107
ABF Freight Systems 1997 -0.032 -0.043 -0.159 -0.064
American Freightways 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
American Freightways 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ANR Advance 1993 -0.171 -0.122 -0.171 -0.086
ANR Advance 1997 -0.083 0.000 -0.167 -0.083
A-P-A Transport 1993 -0.017 0.000 -0.033 -0.017
A-P-A Transport 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Averitt Express 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Averitt Express 1997 -0.084 0.000 -0.126 -0.186
Con-Way Central Express 1993 -0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000
Con-Way Central Express 1997 -0.025 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050
Con-Way Western Express 1993 -0.099 -0.074 -0.049 -0.049
Con-Way Western Express 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Di Salvo 1993 -0.016 -0.016 -0.008 -0.040
Di Salvo 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Estes Express 1993 -0.115 -0.058 -0.173 -0.058
Estes Express 1997 -0.088 -0.104 -0.071 -0.053
Fredrickson Motor Express 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fredrickson Motor Express 1997 -0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000
G.I. Trucking 1993 -0.252 0.000 -0.126 -0.163
G.I. Trucking 1997 -0.245 0.000 -0.122 -0.152
Lynden Transport 1993 -0.086 -0.137 -0.173 -0.086
Lynden Transport 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Motor Cargo 1993 -0.105 -0.035 -0.035 -0.070
Motor Cargo 1997 -0.062 -0.031 -0.062 -0.062
NationsWay (NW Transport) 1993 -0.036 -0.036 -0.071 -0.071
NationsWay (NW Transport) 1997 -0.149 -0.037 -0.074 -0.074
New England Motor Freight 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.040
New England Motor Freight 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Old Dominion Freight Lines 1993 -0.172 0.000 -0.103 -0.208
Old Dominion Freight Lines 1997 -0.047 0.000 -0.140 -0.125
Overnite Transportation 1993 -0.043 -0.034 -0.043 -0.119
Overnite Transportation 1997 -0.010 0.000 -0.005 -0.286
Pitt Ohio Express 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pitt Ohio Express 1997 -0.047 -0.047 -0.140 -0.047
Preston Trucking Co. 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Preston Trucking Co. 1997 -0.044 -0.122 -0.087 -0.087
Roadway Express 1993 -0.032 -0.016 -0.064 -0.112
Roadway Express 1997 -0.044 -0.022 -0.087 -0.109
Saia Motor Freight 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Saia Motor Freight 1997 -0.049 -0.024 -0.097 -0.097
Southeastern Freight Lines 1993 -0.009 -0.018 -0.035 -0.166
Southeastern Freight Lines 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000










USF Bestway (TNT Bestway) 1993 -0.065 -0.081 -0.065 -0.065
USF Bestway (TNT Bestway) 1997 -0.094 -0.047 -0.141 -0.141
USF Holland (TNT Holland Motor 
Express)
1993 -0.019 -0.043 -0.039 -0.104
USF Holland (TNT Holland Motor 
Express)
1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
USF1 Red Star 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
USF Red Star 1997 -0.101 0.000 -0.101 -0.133
USF Reddaway (TNT Reddaway) 1993 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.066
USF’ Reddaway (TNT Reddaway) 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Viking Freight System 1993 0.000 -0.051 -0.015 -0.005
Viking Freight System 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ward Trucking 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ward Trucking 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Watkins Motor Lines 1993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Watkins Motor Lines 1997 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.111
Wilson Trucking 1993 -0.022 -0.022 -0.132 -0.119
Wilson Trucking 1997 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yellow Freight System 1993 -0.017 -0.017 -0.034 -0.043
Yellow Freight System 1997 -0.023 -0.011 -0.011 -0.068
“Amount of inefficiency is calculated by subtracting the actual value from the projected efficient value. Efficient observations 
are shown in bold. The number of inefficient observations is 42.
TABLE 5
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE AMOUNT OF INEFFICIENCY 




Average -0.067 -0.032 -0.077 -0.091
Maximum -0.252 -0.137 -0.173 -0.286
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Median -0.048 -0.022 -0.069 -0.084
“The amount of inefficiency is calculated by subtracting the actual value from the projected efficient value. The number of 
inefficient observations is 42.
better able to strategically position their 
company to provide high quality customer service 
than those with operations titles.
Table 6 contains information regarding the 
Wilcoxon test performed to determine whether 
the efficient observations differ from the ineffi-
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TABLE 6
LINEAR RANK STATISTICS 
EFFICIENT VS INEFFICIENT 
MOTOR CARRIERS





Inefficient 30 2,414,820,519 
Efficient 15 736,479,973
WILCOXON TEST Prob > |Z1 =0.043







WILCOXON TEST Prob > IZI = 0.155
a Data are obtained from the American Trucking 
Association’s financial database, Financial and Operating 
Statistics. These data are accumulated over the two-year 
period of the study.
b Complete data was not available for all observations.
cient observations in terms of size, measured by 
ton-miles driven, and profitability, measured by 
the operating ratio. It should be noted that not 
all observations are included in this analysis 
because the financial information included in the 
American Trucking Association’s Financial and 
Operating Statistics database for the years 1993 
and 1997 is not complete. There are no legal 
requirements for the carriers to file this 
information; so many companies do not include 
all requested data. The average ton-miles 
operated by the inefficient carriers appear to be 
much greater than that of the efficient carriers. 
However, the null hypothesis that the mean 
number of ton-miles operated for the inefficient 
observations equals or exceeds that of the 
efficient observations is rejected at a level of 
0.043. This suggests that efficient observations 
are the larger carriers. A similar test was 
conducted for the operating ratio. The average
operating ratio for the inefficient observations is 
0.942 while for the efficient observations it is 
0.928. The null hypothesis that the mean 
operating ratio for the inefficient observations is 
lower than that of the efficient observations 
cannot be rejected. There is no perceived 
difference in the profitability of the two groups.
The inefficient observations are further divided 
into the larger observations, defined as those 
with ton-miles exceeding the sample’s average 
ton-miles. Ten observations (out of 42 inefficient 
observations) are in this group. 75% of those 
observations show the operating title as the 
variable with the largest amount of inefficiency, 
while there are none for the financial or 
maintenance/safety titles. The observations with 
an operating ratio below that of the sample’s 
average ratio (more profitable) is fifteen out of 
42. In this case, the operations title appears most 
often (56% of the time) for the largest amount of 
inefficiency and the financial title appears least 
often (2%). The maintenance/safety title appears 
13% of the time and the marketing title occurs in 
29% of the observations. This is consistent with 
the overall examination of the 42 inefficient 
observations and suggests that even though the 
larger and more profitable observations are those 
with inefficiency in the number of operations 
managers, a decrease in the number of 
operations managers could lead to increased 
customer perceived satisfaction. This also is true 
for the number of marketing managers.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The literature suggests that, even though senior 
managers are expected to have a generalist’s 
view of their organization, in fact, each typically 
brings an orientation that has developed from 
experience and training in some primary 
functional area. Indeed, Bayster and Ford (2000) 
find that those in different functional classifi­
cations make significantly different decisions. 
The Corsi, Grimm and Feitler study (1992) 
suggests that the deregulated environment for 
LTL motor carriers is one where those 
managerial skills relating to marketing and 
product development are perceived as having
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greater value than those focused on accounting 
and production. This study suggests that motor 
carrier managerial hierarchies can do more than 
simply recognize this “trending” phenomenon. 
Specifically, the portfolio of functional expertise 
of senior managers should be an important 
aspect of the company’s business strategy.
Data envelopment analysis is used to provide a 
quantitative framework that enables senior 
managers to benchmark this strategic human 
resource activity and to specifically identify 
relative inefficiencies in the existing hierarchal 
structure of LTL motor earners. The manner in 
which the LTL configures its senior level of 
managers around functional categories will have 
a variety of strategic impacts. Managers with a 
marketing orientation will focus on product 
innovation, related diversification, advertising, 
and quality of customer relations. Those with an 
operating background will concentrate on 
automation, equipment newness, ability to 
expedite deliveries, actual performance of the 
service, and overall quality of the service. The 
maintenance/safety point of reference will stress 
on-time performance and lack of downtime due to 
equipment failures. Managers with a finance 
orientation will devote their attentions to 
competitiveness and simplicity of rate structures.
This research provides additional insight and 
support for previous studies regarding the 
organizational structure of LTL motor carriers. 
The results of the present study confirm that 
senior level managers in operations- and 
marketing-oriented functions are more prevalent 
in the current operating environment and that 
maintenance and safety functions are less 
prevalent. However, the data envelopment 
analysis of this study suggests that during the 
time period examined, most LTL motor carriers 
were relatively inefficient in configuring senior 
management hierarchies in the pursuit of their 
customer satisfaction objective. The results also 
suggest that an optimal balance between senior 
level managers in the four categories can be 
obtained to reach the targeted objective.
There are compelling reasons in the competitive 
environment of LTL motor carriers to actively 
manage this link between senior managers’ 
proficiencies and company strategy. Many 
shippers are now paring down the number of 
carriers they use to a specific core group in order 
to better form win/win partnerships. Large LTL 
carriers must recognize the urgency to 
restructure their multi-tier organizational 
hierarchies and perhaps begin to emulate the 
more customer-oriented approach of the regional 
carriers. They will need to continue to simplify 
pricing structures and maintain higher levels of 
communication with shippers. The methodology 
described in this paper is an effective technique 
to assist LTL firms in benchmarking themselves 
against their peers in order to reach their 
strategic goals.
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THE IMPACT OF STATE TAXES 
ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND 






The presence of certain state taxes is believed to have a negative impact on truck registration 
and the location decisions of trucking firms. For example, in a metropolitan area that covers 
two or more states, a trucking firm might not choose to locate in the county that is in close 
proximity to the metropolitan area’s business districts, population centers, and largest 
concentration of customers, if that county is in a state that imposes the taxes. Instead, it 
might choose to locate in a county that belongs to another state that does not impose such 
taxes as long as that county is adjacent to the metropolitan area’s most industrialized 
districts. This paper examines the impact that state taxes have on the very competitive 
trucking industry. Through a case study of Kentucky, we illustrate how state taxes such as 
the motor vehicle usage tax and the weight distance tax can adversely affect the trucking 
firm’s decisions in registering and plating trucks, and in locating its facilities.
BACKGROUND
On the average, a typical U.S. trucking firm 
earns only 3 to 4 cents on the dollar after taxes, 
compared to the 7 to 9% average profit margin of 
the heavy manufacturing industry (Dun and 
Bradstreet, 1999). As such, there is a growing 
concern regarding the profitability of the U.S. 
trucking industry, despite strong shipment 
growth and a moderate increase in freight rates
over the last few years. Such anxiety partially 
originates from volatile fuel prices, and chronic 
truck driver shortage and retention problems. To 
make matters worse, some states such as 
Kentucky, still levy taxes on regionally based 
trucking firms and their assets. These taxes 
include the motor vehicle usage tax (MVUT) and 
the weight distance tax (WDT). These taxes can 
further reduce the trucking industry’s thin profit 
margin and exacerbate its competitiveness.
Fall 2000 33
For instance, in Kentucky where both MVUT and 
WDT are still intact, it has the second highest 
trucking business failure rate among eight 
neighboring states (see Appendix A). Such a 
high business failure rate is puzzling, given that 
the average revenue per trucking establishment 
in Kentucky during 1997 was above the national 
average and far greater than those of three 
neighboring states (Missouri, Virginia, and West 
Virginia) (See Appendix D). Many trucking firms 
believe that Kentucky’s unique tax policy is the 
culprit.
Kentucky’s MVUT is similar to taxes charged in 
many other states. It is basically a sales tax on 
all motor vehicles, including the rolling stock 
purchased by trucking firms. Some states, such 
as Kentucky, make all rolling stock fully taxable, 
whereas others cap the tax at a maximum fee or 
apportion it according to mileage driven in state. 
The last two methods are often less of a burden 
than those imposed by full coverage. Florida 
apportions sales taxes so that the more a truck is 
driven out of state, the less its owner pays. Some 
states, such as Indiana, exempt rolling stock 
from usage/sales taxation completely {American 
Trucking Association, 2000).
For example, a $100,000 purchase of rolling stock 
by a trucking firm that chooses to register and 
plate the truck in Kentucky, results in the owner 
having to pay an additional $6,000 in usage/sales 
taxes (6% sales tax ' $100,000). In Indiana, 
where rolling stock is exempt from that state’s 
sales taxes, an owner would not have to pay 
$6,000. A trucking firm owner in Kentucky 
would do better to license his/her truck in 
Indiana and buy parts or rolling stock from an 
Indiana supplier than to conduct such 
transactions in Kentucky. In states where there 
is a cap, like North Carolina or Vermont, the 
owner pays a pro-rated amount of what the tax 
bill would ordinarily be. Since equipment costs 
account for 34.3% of a truckload carrier’s costs, 
MVUT can raise an owner’s cost of capital 
substantially and thus can be perceived as an 
economic burden by the carrier (Boyer, 1998).
Kentucky’s weight distance tax (WDT) is unique 
in that Kentucky is one of only four states 
(Kentucky, New York, New Mexico, and Idaho) 
that levy such a tax. Weight distance taxes also 
have been called ton-mile taxes or ton-axle taxes 
in other states because the intent of such taxes is 
to penalize the heaviest users of roadways and 
those who cause the greatest amount of 
depreciation in highway pavement and 
infrastructure. Thus, the owners of large, heavy 
commercial trucks pay a greater amount in taxes 
to a state’s road fund than would the owners of 
much smaller vehicles. These trucks usually 
have five or more axles for both tractor and 
trailer and usually weigh around 60,000 pounds 
or more. From a public finance standpoint, such 
a tax makes sense if the heaviest user of a public 
good can be identified.
The dilemma is whether the user can pay the 
tax, and if so, can the tax be collected in a fair 
and efficient manner using self-reports. If not, 
some trucking firms will take the opportunity to 
“cheat” on taxes. Their marginal costs of 
creating road depreciation and restoration are 
borne by someone else (Boyer, 1998). In this 
situation, collecting the tax in a fair and efficient 
manner becomes problematic, since typical 
trucking firms cross many jurisdictional lines 
and self-report the taxes. To make matters 
complicated, there is no reciprocity among the 
states to collect these types of taxes that are 
different from fuel taxes and registration fees. In 
the past, both Ohio and Wyoming eliminated 
WDT because of the paperwork burden, the cost 
associated with the maintenance and expansion 
of ports of entry, and high rates of tax evasion by 
firms that were headquartered out of state 
(Smith and Associates, 1981; Curran and 
Stewart, 1982).
The main purpose of this study is to examine 
whether MVUT and WDT were detrimental to 
the state’s trucking industry development and 
growth. In so doing, we analyzed available 
secondary data summarized in Appendices A 
though D and then conducted an empirical 
survey of trucking executives.
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By examining secondary data sources such as the 
Census Bureau’s Censuses of Transportation 
(1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997); County Business 
Patterns (1967 to 1996); Vehicle Inventory and 
Use Surveys (1982,1987, 1992, and 1997); and 
Censuses of Manufactures (1982, 1987,1992, and 
1997) along with business failure rate records 
from Dun and Bradstreet (1999), we found 
Kentucky’s trucking industry to be less profitable 
than most of the neighboring states. Kentucky 
and its major urban areas were behind other 
localities regarding the average size and number 
of trucking establishments, the number of trucks 
registered in each state, and the percentage of 
the area’s workforce devoted to trucking. 
Although Kentucky had made strong gains in 
manufacturing over the years, and its labor force 
was roughly the same size as Tennessee’s and 
Virginia’s, the trucking industry did not do well 
when compared to surrounding states’ trucking 
industries (See Appendices A through D).
Sample
In an effort to assess how the managers or 
owners of a firm felt about the state’s MVUT and 
WDT, a special mail questionnaire was developed 
for trucking executives whose firms are based in 
Kentucky and Indiana. The questionnaire con­
tained various questions related to the size of the 
fleet owned by the responding firms, their annual 
gross revenue, the primary location of truck 
registration and plating, the perceived effects of 
MVUT and WDT on the responding firm’s 
trucking establishments and operations, and 
business climate with regard to the trucking 
industry. A sample of 500 respondents was 
randomly selected from both the Kentucky Motor 
Transport Association (KMTA) members and the 
National Motor Carrier Directory (1999) 
members based primarily in the states of 
Kentucky and Indiana. A survey was sent out in 
the fourth quarter of 1999 and some responses 
were received into early 2000. From this sample, 
a total of 112 trucking companies responded to 
the questionnaire. This produced a usable 
response rate of 22.4% that is higher than the
20% cut-off rate that is considered desirable for 
a valid survey (Yu and Cooper, 1983).
For-hire carriers made up 79.3% of the 
respondents. About half (54.4%) of the 
respondents had medium to large size trucking 
fleets (i.e., 11 trucks or more). More than half 
(60%) of the respondents turned out to be large 
carriers that reported annual revenues of $1 
million or more. Before it was dismantled in 
1995, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) classified large carriers as those that 
engaged in interstate transportation and had 
revenues of $1 million or more (Silverman et al., 
1997). A majority (70.1%) of the respondents 
said their trucks are primarily licensed or plated 
in Kentucky. Some of the responding firms’ 
trucks are licensed or plated in Indiana (10.3%), 
Tennessee (6.2%), Illinois (4.1%), Ohio (4.1%), 
and other states (5.2%). More than half (57%) of 
the trucking Firms that plate the majority of their 
trucks in Kentucky are small carriers who own 
less than 10 trucks. None of the large carriers 
(i.e., those fleets totaling 50 or more trucks) had 
vehicles plated in Kentucky. With these 
numbers, one can see how a great number of all 
firms’ trucks could be plated out of state 
although 70% of the firms indicated that their 
trucks are primarily licensed or plated in 
Kentucky.
“Plating” a truck is the payment of a license fee 
to a state. Plating a truck in a particular state 
should indicate where the truck’s main terminal 
is located, but this is not always the case. 
Registration fees vary from state to state, and 
how much a company has to pay in registration 
fees to a state depends upon how many miles the 
company’s trucks drive in that state for a given 
year. If a truck owner plates a truck in a 
particular state, he/she ends up paying first year 
registration fees to that state for distribution to 
all states in which the truck plans to operate, 
based upon projected use of the truck. If a new 
truck is plated or licensed or registered in 
Kentucky, then it pays its fees to the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. If a Kentucky 
licensed truck drives any distance in Indiana, 
Illinois, Tennessee, and/or any other state, then
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it must pay its part of its Kentucky fees to these 
states based upon the number of miles driven 
within each state. For example, an 80,000 pound 
Kentucky licensed truck that is driven 30% of the 
time in Kentucky, 40% of the time in Indiana, 
and 30% in Tennessee will pay 30% of its roughly 
$1,260 registration fee to Kentucky, 40% to 
Indiana, and 30% to Tennessee.
Considering that some trucking firms tend to 
register and plate their trucks out of state to 
minimize tax payments, we asked respondents 
about their “plating” decisions and why they 
decided to register and plate a truck as they did. 
MVUT appeared to heavily influence plating 
decisions, since 60% of the respondents agreed 
that Kentucky’s MVUT makes it too expensive to 
buy trucks and parts in the state (see Table 1). 
Almost half (49%) of the respondents agreed that
Kentucky’s WDT makes it costlier to plate their 
trucks in the state. On the other hand, a 
majority of the respondents seemed to agree that 
the amount of required paperwork, and the 
demand for a local firm’s services did not matter 
when it came to plating decisions (see Table 1).
Because of the WDT and MVUT, there is an 
incentive to plate and register trucks in a state 
other than Kentucky. To minimize the WDT 
payment, owners in Kentucky have an incentive 
to report more miles driven in other states. Fuel 
taxes are reported separately from WDT records. 
To avoid Kentucky audits for the WDT, a truck 
owner might report that its truck drove 30% of 
its miles in Kentucky, and 70% in Indiana for the 
WDT payment (although the breakdown might 
actually be 50/50 for fuel taxes). Furthermore, it 
would probably be in the owner’s best interests,
TABLE 1
DETERMINANTS AFFECTING THE TRUCKING FIRM’S PLATING DECISIONS
Determinants The Degree of Agreement*
SA A A/D D SD
Kentucky’s motor vehicle tax makes it too expensive to buy trucks and 
parts in the state.
48.0% 12.0% 2.0% 10.0% 28.0%
If the motor vehicle tax were repealed, our firm would plate all of its 
trucks in Kentucky.
36.0% 18.0% 12.0% 6.0% 28.0%
Our suppliers and customers are located over a vast area. 21.7% 28.3% 20.0% 19.6% 10.4%
Kentucky’s weight distance tax makes it costly to plate our trucks in 
the state.
39.2% 9.8% 15.7% 15.7% 19.6%
Kentucky has a bad labor climate compared to other states. 18.0% 18.0% 40.0% 14.0% 10.0%
Kentucky’s labor force is not adequate so we must locate trucks 
elsewhere.
10.9% 26.1% 32.6% 17.4% 13.0%
Kentucky’s safety regulations make it costlier to plate trucks in the 
State.
22.0% 10.0% 34.0% 16.0% 18.0%
Kentucky requires too much paperwork in order to plate a truck within 
the state.
12.0% 16.0% 42.0% 18.0% 12.0%
There is insufficient demand in Kentucky for our firm’s services 12.0% 16.0% 26.0% 18.0% 28.0%
*SA = Strongly Agree A = Agree A/D = Neither Agree Nor Disagree D = Disagree SD = Strongly Disagree
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as long as the firm remains close to its 
customers, to physically relocate to another state 
where he/she will report more miles driven 
within that state and/or other states. Doing this 
will help the owner to minimize WDT payments 
and the possibility of an audit.
There is no reciprocity among states to collect the 
WDT as there exists with the collection of fuel 
taxes. It also entices the owner to plate his/her 
trucks in the state that does not have a WDT. 
This can also be done to avoid Kentucky’s MVUT. 
Most records on how much and where the truck 
travels will come from a firm’s fuel tax reports 
that are mandated by all 50 states under the 
Interstate Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA). These 
reports help reallocate and readjust gas tax 
receipts from state to state. If gas taxes are paid 
by a truck driver who fills up his tank in 
Louisville, and yet the fuel is used in Indiana, 
then all taxes collected in Louisville should go to 
Indiana.
Considering the additional tax burden, some 
firms (41.5%) indicated that they had thought 
about moving their business from the state. 
More than one third of the respondents (40.2%) 
doubted that all firms accurately report their 
mileage driven in the state of Kentucky. Also, 
due to perceived adverse effects of MVUT and 
WDT, some firms (44.4%) would prefer to pay 
more in registration fees and diesel fuel taxes 
than to pay the MVUT and WDT (see Table 2).
Since Tables 1 and 2 show a large number (a 
total of 16) of constructs, the authors needed to 
identify a smaller set of common factors that 
account for most of the observed variation in 
responses. An exploratory factor analysis of the 
responses served this purpose. The factor 
analysis was used to determine the minimum 
number of common factors needed to explain cor­
relation among the factors using the eigenvalue 
greater-than-one rule. To obtain a more mean­
ingful representation of the factor structure, we 
used the Varimax rotation with Kaiser 
Normalization. As summarized in Table 3, we 
extracted four common factors: (1) tax burdens; 
(2) business climate; (3) business hassles; and (4)
interstate operations. These factors may have 
affected a trucking firm’s decisions to plate a 
truck out of state.
Hypothesis Development and Testing
Based upon the sample described earlier, we 
developed the following key hypotheses to 
validate the economic implications of MVUT and 
WDT for Kentucky’s trucking industry.
Hp A trucking firm’s perception that Kentucky’s 
MVUT makes it too expensive to buy trucks 
and parts in the state significantly influences 
its decision to register and plate trucks out of 
state.
Considering the added capital cost resulting from 
MVUT, we attempted to examine whether the 
presence of MVUT has affected the trucking 
firm’s decision to register, plate, and locate out of 
state. For example, we discovered that some 
trucking firms had left the city of Louisville and 
Jefferson County in Kentucky and had relocated 
to an adjoining county across the Ohio River in 
southern Indiana where neither MVUT nor WDT 
was imposed. Among the respondents whose 
firms are headquartered in and/or have 
substantial operations in Kentucky, a majority 
indicated that their trucks are primarily 
registered or plated out of state, such as in 
Indiana, Illinois, and Tennessee.
The premise is that the MVUT discourages the 
trucking firm to register, plate, or establish in 
Kentucky. To test such a premise, we paired the 
dummy dependent variable (1 = a decision to 
register or plate trucks out of state, 0 = a decision 
to stay in Kentucky) with the independent 
variable “the degree of agreement with the 
statement that Kentucky’s MVUT makes it too 
expensive to buy trucks and parts” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The result of the 
regression supports Hj at CL = .05 ip-value = 
.0265).
H2: A trucking firm’s perceived burden of 
Kentucky’s WDT significantly influences its 




PERCEIVED TAX BURDENS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
TRUCKING ESTABLISHMENTS AND GROWTH
Perceived Tax Burdens The Degree of Agreement*
SA A A/D D SD
All trucking firms, whether based in Kentucky or out of state, do their 
best to accurately report the number of miles they drive within 
Kentucky.
22.5% 25.2% 12.1% 24.3% 15.9%
Aside from some problems, our firm is very competitive with out-of­
state-based competition.
13.1% 31.8% 23.4% 26.2% 5.5%
It would be better for our firm to pay more in registration fees and 
diesel fuel taxes than to continue to report and pay the weight distance 
tax and/or motor vehicle usage tax.
25.5% 18.9% 26.4% 14.2% 15.0%
Our firm has thought about leaving the State of Kentucky. 28.3% 13.2% 24.5% 13.2% 20.8%
Kentucky’s motor vehicle usage and weight distance taxes make it 
difficult to expand our business.
22.5% 16.8% 22.4% 19 6% 18.7%
Aside from some problems, Kentucky has a very good business climate 
for the motor freight industry.
6.5% 28.0% 26.3% 28.0% 11.2%
Exemption from the motor vehicle usage tax was a factor in our firm’s 
decision to locate in an enterprise zone or to stay in an area that was 
later declared an enterprise zone or part of an enterprise zone.
23.1% 11.5% 38.5% 11.5% 15.4%
*SA = Strongly Agree A = Agree A/D = Neither Agree Nor Disagree D = Disagree SD = Strongly Disagree
Similar to hypothesis Hj, trucking firms are 
expected to move away from a state (Kentucky) 
where the WDT is imposed. Also, WDT is diffi­
cult for the trucking firm to monitor. Thus, we 
posit that the trucking firm tends to register or 
plate trucks out of state to avoid the WDT. We 
paired the dummy dependent variable (1 = a 
decision to register or plate out of state, 0 = a 
decision to stay in Kentucky) with the indepen­
dent variable “the degree of agreement on the 
perceived impact of the WDT on the expense of 
plating” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). Contrary to expectations, the regression 
results indicate that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between these variables 
at CL = .05 ip-value = .6053).
H3: A trucking firm’s concern over the inadequate 
labor force in Kentucky significantly effects 
its decision to register and plate trucks out of 
state.
Considering a record low unemployment rate and 
the subsequent labor shortage (especially among 
truck drivers) in Kentucky, it was assumed that 
the labor shortage contributed to the departure 
of some trucking establishments. To test this 
hypothesis, we measured the independent vari­
able, “the degree of agreement on the perceived 
labor shortage in Kentucky” on a five-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). This variable was paired with the same 
dummy dependent variable that we used in the
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TABLE 3
FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS
Factors and Items Loadings
Factor 1: Tax Burdens of MVUT and WDT (Eigenvalue: 7.378)
1. The MVUT and WDT make it difficult to expand business. .968
2. If the MVUT were repealed, firm would plate all trucks in Kentucky. .914
3. Willingness to pay more in registration fees and diesel fuel taxes than to continue to report and pay .912
MVUT and WDT.
4. Firm has thought about leaving the state. .877
5. MVUT makes it difficult and too expensive to buy trucks and parts. .871
6. If WDT were repealed, firm would plate all trucks in Kentucky. .850
7. Exemption from MVUT was a factor in locating in an enterprise zone. .757
8. WDT makes it too costly to plate in Kentucky. .704
Factor 2: Business Climate (Eigenvalue: 5.318)
1. Kentucky has a very good business climate. -.916
2. Kentucky has a bad labor climate. .863
3. Kentucky’s labor force is not adequate. .813
4. Kentucky’s safety regulations make it costlier to plate trucks in the State. .753
Factor 3: Business Hassles (Eigenvalue: 1.879)
1. Too much paperwork to plate a truck. .971
2. Insufficient demand for services. .793
3. Suppliers and customers are located over a vast area. .615
Factor 4: Interstate Trucking Operations (Eigenvalue: 1.292)
1. Accurate report of the number of miles driven within Kentucky. .917
2. Competitiveness in out-of-state trucking. .901
Reliability Coefficient = .9018
previous two hypotheses. The regression ana­
lysis indicates that the decision to register or 
plate out of state is significantly related to the 
inadequate labor force in Kentucky at 06 = .05 ip- 
value = .0172). Somewhat congruent with this 
result, more than one-third (36%) of the 
respondents agreed that Kentucky has a bad 
labor climate compared to other states (see Table 
1).
H4: A trucking firm’s resistance to costly
safety regulations in Kentucky 
significantly effects its decision to register 
and plate trucks out of state.
Safety regulations could have caused trucking 
companies to relocate due to increased safety 
standards on trucks and subsequent cost 
increases that accompany compliance. Thus, we 
hypothesized that Kentucky’s safety regulations 
had driven some firms out of the state. Results 
of the regression, however, forced the rejection of 
this hypothesis. In other words, no significant 
relationship between the trucking firm’s regis­
tration/plating decision and the degree of 
agreement on the negative consequence of safety 
regulations at a = .05 ip-value = .0908) was 
found.
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H5: A trucking firm’s resistance to excessive
paperwork requirements in Kentucky 
significantly effects its decision to register 
and plate trucks out of state.
In the case of both Wyoming and Ohio, the 
burden of the paperwork necessary for 
compliance with the WDT was one of the main 
reasons why WDT was made a candidate for 
repeal in those states. Therefore, we made a 
premise that the excessive paperwork 
requirement is yet another reason for plating a 
truck out of state. Contrary to our expectation, 
this hypothesis was rejected at a = .05 ip-value = 
.6826).
H6: The trucking establishment in a state (as
measured by the number of general 
freight, long-distance, 5-axle trucks 
registered in the state for a given year) is 
inversely related to the presence of WDT, 
MVUT, diesel taxes, and/or registration 
fees.
Kentucky’s situation raises questions as to 
whether trucking firms throughout the nation 
engage in the same tax avoidance behavior. To 
see if Kentucky’s situation can be generalized to 
other states, we attempted to examine whether 
various taxes have negative consequences on 
trucking establishments in any given state. In 
particular, we used the number of general 
freight, long distance trucks as a surrogate 
measure for the number of trucking establish­
ments in a given state. The rationale is that 
less-than-truckload (LTL) and/or short-haul 
carriers do not usually have very large trucks 
that would be covered by the WDT and usually 
do not travel outside of a limited geographic area. 
These carriers have to stay very close to 
customers, due to the perishable nature of their 
freight such as milk, frozen foods, and 
agricultural products. These regional LTL 
carriers are often exempted from state taxes. In 
Kentucky, for example, many LTL carriers that
exclusively ship agricultural goods are exempt 
from various taxes that other trucking firms 
must pay.
Considering the possibility that some trucking 
firms would locate their trucks out of state to 
avoid taxes, we postulated that the number of 
registered trucks (large, general freight, 
commercial 5-axle trucks weighing at least 
60,000 pounds) is likely to be smaller in states 
which have one or more taxes such as MVUT, 
WDT, and diesel fuel taxes than in those states 
which do not impose such taxes. Similarly, 
registration fees may have effected trucking 
establishments in a given state adversely.
Prior to testing the above hypothesis, we 
developed a fifty state database using the 
quinquennial publications of the Census of 
Transportation, Census of Manufactures, and 
Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey for the years 
1987, 1992, and 1997. In addition, tax data was 
gathered from the American Trucking Associa­
tion (ATA). As a preliminary testing procedure 
of hypothesis H6, we measured to what degree a 
relationship exists between dependent and 
independent variables through correlation 
matrices summarized in Table 4. Since 
significant correlations were identified among 
the independent variables at CL = .05, we 
conducted additional statistical tests by using 
step-wise regression to eliminate redundant 
independent variables such as WDT and diesel 
fuel taxes.
Test results shown in Table 5 indicate that the 
trucking establishment, in terms of number of 
registered trucks in each state, is inversely related 
to the presence of MVUT, whereas the number of 
trucking establishments is positively related to 
the presence of registration fees at CL = .01. On the 
other hand, both WDT and diesel fuel taxes per 
gallon are not significantly correlated with the 
number of trucking establishments. Therefore, H6 
is not fully supported by our test results.









Number of Trucks 1.0
MVUT -.213** 1.0
WDT -.122 .051 1.0
Diesel Fuel Tax .201** .043 - .237** 1.0









Standard Error Standardized 
Coefficient (Beta)
Significance Level
Constant 6951.004 3573.593 .000
MVUT -4705.410 1675.423 -.217 .006**
Registration Fees 10.296 2.877 .277 .000**
WDT Excluded Excluded Excluded .768
Diesel Fuel Tax Excluded Excluded Excluded .177
F-ratio = 10.204, significant at p < .01 **p < .01
One thing to note is that there is a significantly 
positive relationship between the number of 
trucking establishments and the presence of 
registration fees. This is contrary to expecta­
tions, but could explain why most of the 
respondents prefer to pay registration fees over 
the MVUT. Perhaps reporting and paying 
registration fees are much easier to administer 
and require less paperwork than paying the 
MVUT. Higher registration fees have been used 
in the past in many states to replace the revenue 
lost from the repeal of the WDT. Another
rationale may be that higher registration fees are 
not an administrative burden.
Also, states that have the strongest demand for 
trucking services and travel might be able to 
charge higher fees to all trucks coming into their 
state because truck registration fees are based 
upon the number of miles that a truck drives in 
each state. Those states in which a lot of miles 
are driven can charge higher fees, because 
carriers have inelastic demand for those states’ 
roadways. Finally, if business is good enough,
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and shipments to or from a particular state are 
very high, higher fees are not problematic for 
trucking firms.
H7: The trucking establishment in a state (as 
measured by the number of general freight, 
long-distance, 5-axle trucks registered in the 
state for a given year) is positively correlated 
with the value of manufactured goods 
shipped from each state.
Costelleo and Saltes (2000) recently observed 
that growth patterns in revenues for the trucking 
industry are strongly linked to increases in 
consumer spending and manufacturing activity. 
In other words, trucking firms tend to adjust 
their shipping volume and the subsequent 
trucking establishment as demand increases. 
Since trucks shipped 75% of all manufactured 
goods in 1993 and 78% in 1997, we feel that the 
value of the manufactured goods shipped is a 
good proxy value for the demand of trucking 
services. Therefore, we posit that the value of 
goods shipped should be a good indicator of the 
number of trucks (or trucking establishments) in 
a given state.
To test the above hypothesis, we paired the 
independent variable “value of goods shipped” 
with the dependent variable “trucking 
establishment.” Both correlation and simple 
regression analyses indicate that the value of 
goods shipped has a strong positive relationship 
with the number of trucking establishments (in 
terms of number of trucks) at CL = .01 (r = .768 
and p-value = .000).
MAJOR FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
This section summarizes key findings of the 
study and the practical implications for trucking 
firms who must cope with stringent state tax and 
regulatory policies.
First, the MVUT is perceived to be a heavy 
burden for most of the responding firms and 
consequently has become a major motivating 
factor behind some firm’s attempts to move away 
from Kentucky. It would be better for a
Louisville trucking firm to locate in southern 
Indiana, register its trucks there, and buy rolling 
stock in southern Indiana in order to avoid 
paying $.06 for every dollar of capital equipment 
bought because Indiana does not levy such a tax. 
An office headquartered in southern Indiana 
could be a simple one-room operation while the 
company’s main operations remain in Kentucky, 
or the whole company and its facilities could 
move to southern Indiana.
Considering that the MVUT can substantially 
increase the owner of a trucking firm’s cost of 
capital, it is not surprising to find that Kentucky 
has relatively few trucking establishments with 
100 or more employees (see Appendix B). 
However, defying our common sense, neither the 
WDT nor diesel fuel tax appeared to be an 
important deterrent to the number of trucking 
establishments in a given state. As evidenced by 
our 50 state data analyses, such a pattern can be 
generalized to other states. Similarly, strict 
safety regulations and excessive paperwork 
requirements have no significant influence on the 
trucking firm’s plating and registration decisions.
Second, we discovered that registration fees were 
positively, not negatively correlated with trucking 
establishments. The positive sign for registra­
tion fees can be explained by the mutually 
exclusive tax policy of many states. By 
examining the data for the 50 states, those states 
that have higher than average registration fees 
usually do not have the MVUT. These states, on 
average, also have a higher number of registered 
large trucks and trucking establishments in their 
jurisdictions. Perhaps this is one of the reasons 
why the registration fee increase is the most 
commonly chosen alternative, whenever the 
MVUT, the WDT, or another form of taxes on 
trucks is repealed and/or replaced by increases in 
other taxes.
Finally, despite a dramatic increase (by 102%) 
from 1987 to 1992 in the amount of manufac­
tured goods shipped in Kentucky and its positive 
impact on the trucking industry, the number of 
heavy trucks registered in Kentucky has shown 
anemic growth. As a matter of fact, Kentucky
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ranked first among eight neighboring states we 
examined with respect to value of goods shipped, 
but ranked last with respect to growth in 
trucking firms (or the number of trucks). In 
particular, we find that the number of trucks 
used by for-hire and owner-operated carriers 
located in Kentucky declined between 1987 and 
1997. This disparity may have stemmed from 
the fact that out of state firms, who are free from 
additional tax burdens, and consequently become 
more price competitive than Kentucky-based 
firms, take some trucking business away from 
Kentucky. The verification of such a fact 
requires further research.
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APPENDIX A
AVERAGE TRUCKING BUSINESS FAILURE RATES
1984 - 1995









Source: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
APPENDIX B
SIZE CONSIDERATIONS: TOTAL EMPLOYMENT, 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES PER ESTABLISHMENT, AND 
ESTABLISHMENTS WITH MORE THAN 100 EMPLOYEES
1996
State Total Number of Average Number of Establishments with 100 or More
Employees Employees Employees
Illinois 94,733 16 120
Ohio 81,169 16 115
Indiana 55,181 16 77
Tennessee 52,636 19 68
Missouri 48,186 13 56
Virginia 36,901 12 49
Kentucky 22,976 10 29
West Virginia 9,963 8 8
Source: US Census Bureau’s 1996 County Business Patterns
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APPENDIX C








Nashville-Davidson County 55 $31,289
Indianapolis-Marian County 44 $30,748
Shelby County (Memphis) 39 $31,284
Hamilton County (Cincinnati) 38 $31,558
St. Louis County 27 $29,520
Jefferson County (Louisville) 25 $28,591
Lexington-Fayette County 24 $26,952
United States 15 $29,999
Source: US Census Bureau’s County Business Patters
APPENDIX D
AVERAGE REVENUE PER ESTABLISHMENT IN A GIVEN STATE
Data from 1992 Census of Transportation







Paid Emp. Avg. Emp. Avg. Pay Avg. Rev. 
per Estab.
Ohio 1,346 $ 2,961,495 $ 887,534 28,492 21 $31,150 $2,200,219
Illinois 1,179 2,998,419 934,268 29,079 24 32,129 2,543,188
Indiana 1,020 2,162,543 644,813 23,432 23 27,518 2,120,140
Missouri 980 1,840,875 563,042 21,416 22 26,291 1,878,444
Tennessee 842 2,310,043 711,258 24,184 29 29,410 2,743,519
Virginia 569 914,598 269,331 10,047 18 26,807 1,607,378
Kentucky 388 695,481 169,608 6,636 17 25,559 1,792,477
West Virginia 158 197,030 53,575 2,264 14 23,664 1,247,025
United States 25,014 55,257,352 15,879,651 553,202 22 28,705 2,209,057
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Data from 1997 Census of Transportation







Paid Emp. Avg. Emp. Avg. Pay Avg. Rev. 
per Estab.
Ohio 1,343 $ 3,754,484 $ 1,144,951 32,113 24 $35,654 $2,795,595
Illinois 1,339 4,040,036 1,274,731 35,497 27 35,911 3,017,204
Indiana 1,174 3,151,455 867,479 27,799 24 31,205 2,684,374
Missouri 1,227 2,249,398 683,650 22,093 19 30,944 1,833,250
Tennessee 1,070 3,372,817 1,149,924 34,911 33 32,939 3,152,165
Virginia 701 1,251,999 385,642 12,657 18 30,469 1,786,017
Kentucky 491 1,285,855 292,380 9,428 19 31,119 2,618,849
West Virginia 175 214,519 63,985 2,211 13 28,939 1,225,823
United States 29,321 76,152,239 22,200,009 684,730 23 32,422 2,597,191
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THE USE OF EDI AND 
INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES IN 
THE U.S. MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY
Richard L. Clarke 
Clemson University
ABSTRACT
Computer to computer data exchange by companies in a supply chain have been well- 
recognized as an effective means of reducing cost and decreasing paperwork errors. In many 
cases, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers have become electronically linked to better 
manage inventory, ordering, and billing information. However, supply chains, by definition, 
also include common carriers that move goods between supply chain partners but may not 
have a long-term relationship with either the shipper or his customers. This could be the 
missing or weak link in an otherwise effective supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the state-of-the-art of EDI in the motor carrier industry to identify possible trends.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems have 
been used by shippers and carriers since the late 
1970s. This article reports on findings of a recent 
survey of large domestic motor carriers regarding 
their use of EDI and emerging Internet 
technologies to provide vital information links 
with their supply chain partners.
INTRODUCTION
Various forms of computer-based information 
technology (IT) have been used to facilitate 
business-to-business transactions for at least 
three decades. During the 1970's, suppliers and 
customers began linking mainframe computers to 
facilitate direct data exchange. Suppliers could 
receive and complete orders without a manual 
purchase request from the customer. Data from
the inventory tracking and production systems 
could be transmitted to the supplier through 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) communica­
tion links. A purchase order could automatically 
be submitted. Invoices could be sent and pay­
ments made through Electronic Funds Transfers 
(EFT). In the freight transportation industry, 
freight forwarders and shippers gained access to 
airline, rail, ship, and truck schedules permitting 
them to book cargo directly utilizing EDI. These 
pockets of technology development redefined 
logistics processes and, by the late 1980's, 
became mandatory for companies seeking to 
maintain their competitiveness.
To engage in traditional EDI, business partners 
must add three components to their existing 
computer systems: EDI standards, EDI
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translation software, and some sort of 
transmission capacity. To illustrate the 
underlying concept, Emmelhainz provides the 
analogy of an American dealing by mail with a 
trading partner in Germany (1993). To 
successfully communicate, the parties would 
require a letter written in “generally accepted 
business format”, translation capacity from 
English to German, and a mail service or other 
method of transmission. With an electronic 
transfer, EDI standards furnish the format, EDI 
software provides the translation, and either 
direct links or value added networks (VANs) are 
utilized.
The key to EDI has been the development and 
implementation of standards—standard business 
procedures, standard definition of business terms 
and standard documents. After considerable 
effort the Transportation Data Coordinating 
Committee (TDCC) adopted data interchange 
standards in the mid-seventies for domestic 
shipments. This action greatly enhanced the 
transportation use of EDI in the United States. 
In the early eighties, the American National 
Standards Institute’s (ANSI) standards 
committee X12 took over the task of expanding 
U.S. industry standards in transportation. And 
by the mid-eighties, the United Nations had 
created EDI for Administration, Commerce, and 
Transportation (EDIFACT). In 1992 the U.S. 
voted to adopt the structure and syntax of 
EDIFACT. However, since the official adoption 
of EDIFACT as the worldwide standard, few U.S. 
transportation carriers have implemented new 
traditional EDI systems. Reasons cited include 
EDI complexity and cost, growth of customized 
systems (lack of true standard systems) and the 
superiority of Internet based information 
systems.
Since the mid-1980's, supply chain managers at 
progressive companies in competitive industries 
have increasingly turned to Internet based 
information technologies to facilitate business-to- 
business logistics transactions like purchasing, 
order processing, inventory management and 
transportation tracking. For example, in 1995 
Michelin N.A. began building a customized
extranet system so their small to midsize 
customers could shop and buy on-line as well as 
track their shipments from origin to destination. 
At the same time, Michelin N.A.continued to 
operate a traditional EDI system for their large 
volume customers. Soon after their extranet 
system was implemented, Michelin’s EDI 
customers wanted to be on the extranet because 
they found it to be superior to EDI (Smith, 1999).
While the literature contains many publications 
dealing with information technology and SCM 
there is little published research on the current 
use of IT (EDI and Internet systems) by the U.S. 
motor carrier industry. Truck transportation in 
the U.S. very often provides the vital physical 
link between suppliers and their customers. In 
fact, trucks carry approximately 80% of the U.S. 
domestic freight by revenue according to a Cass 
Logistics 1999 study (Barber, 1997). 
Unfortunately, the physical movement of goods 
today is often still impeded by ineffective 
information flows that have not kept pace with 
developments in information technology. The 
American Trucking Association estimates that 
required paperwork still can reach as much as 
$900 per truckload in the worst case scenario 
(“Information...”, 1999). The clear implication is 
improvements in both EDI and web-based IT 
may not yet have been realized in the trucking 
business. The purpose of this paper is to present 
the results of a recent study undertaken to 
evaluate the current level of EDI and Internet 
based technology utilization among the largest 
carriers in the U.S. motor carrier industry. 
First, a brief literature review will be presented, 
followed by an explanation of the research 
methodology employed. The results will then be 
discussed and conclusions drawn concerning the 
future of EDI and Internet based information 
technology in the motor carrier industry.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of the recent literature on EDI usage in 
transportation indicates that most applications 
are shipper, customer, or carrier specific. Miller 
reported that over 50 percent cent of EDI 
systems used by motor carriers were proprietary
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and included unique message formats (1995). 
Johnson, Allen and Crum found that while the 
number of motor carriers using EDI increased 
over 100 percent form 1987 to 1990, EDI usage 
was mostly limited to individual carrier-shipper 
transactions (1992). In a more recent survey, 
Seideman found that large shippers typically 
require industry-specific transaction data and 
will only utilize motor carriers able to provide 
that unique information (1992). It also appears 
that customer size makes a difference when it 
comes to establishing EDI links with carriers. 
According to a 1993 logistics technology and 
benchmarking survey conducted by KPMG Peat 
Marwick and Company, 61 percent of shippers 
with annual revenues exceeding $500 million 
have established EDI links with carriers. Only 
35 percent of companies with annual revenues 
under $500 million had done so by 1993 
(Information, 1999). This same survey also 
confirmed earlier reports that most EDI systems 
used by motor earners were not compatible even 
within the trucking industry.
More recently, the literature has reported a 
number of successful implementations of 
Internet based systems by large motor carriers. 
Wood found that in 1999, 78 percent of LTL 
carriers and 62 percent of TL carriers based in 
Arkansas were using some form of e-commerce to 
conduct business with their supply chain 
partners (1999). These carriers include J.B. 
Hunt Transport Services Inc., American Freight 
Ways Corp. and USA Truck. Dryden found that 
many large TL carriers like the $2.5 billion 
Schneider National have invested heavily in 
Internet based systems as a better IT alternative 
to EDI. Schneider’s scope of Internet based 
services is large and includes not only the usual 
shipment tracking by customers but, also 
provides links to all of Schneider’s business 
software. Their web-based system unifies data 
about all modes of transportation in a base of 
over 1000 rail and motor carriers (Dryden, 1999). 
Crum, Johnson and Allen studied EDI between 
U.S. motor carriers and shippers in 1990 and 
again in 1996. Their longitudinal assessment 
found the growth of EDI transactions declined in 
the early nineties. On the other hand, 100
percent of the responding shippers reported 
using Internet technology for business 
transactions with their supply chain partners 
(1998).
In summary, a review of the relevant literature 
published since 1990 shows that important 
strides were made by large U.S. motor carriers in 
the application of EDI technology through about 
1995. Since then, it appears there has been a 
shift away from developing new traditional EDI 
systems to the use of Internet based formation 
systems in business-to-business information 
exchanges involving large motor carriers. Many 
of the reported Internet applications include the 
use of standard EDI transportation formats 
developed in the seventies and eighties 
suggesting an evolutionary progression of 
transportation data interchange.
METHODOLOGY
In order to evaluate the use of and prospects for 
EDI and web-based systems in the U.S. trucking 
industry, an open-ended questionnaire was deve­
loped. This questionnaire contained 15 questions 
and was patterned after the one used success­
fully in a 1994 study by Gourdin and Clarke 
(1994). The questionnaire is shown below in 
Table 1. To identity the largest U.S. trucking 
companies, reference was made to a 1997 survey 
by Inbound Logistics that ranked the top 75 U.S. 
motor carriers in terms of revenues earned from 
trucking operations (Top 25 motor Carriers, 
1998). While over 400,000 for-hire trucking 
firms are registered with the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, fewer than 800 had annual 
revenues exceeding $20 million in 1998 (Coyle, 
2000). The largest trucking companies in the 
U.S. tend to be in the LTL segment which is even 
more concentrated. The top 10 LTL carriers 
account for more than 60% of the total less-than 
truckload business (Coyle, 2000).
The 75 largest trucking companies were targeted 
for this study because of the likelihood they had 
experience with both EDI and Internet 
technologies. The disadvantage of focusing on a 






3. Where was EDI system developed?
4. Is EDI system accessible by outside parties?
5. Whom do you exchange data with via EDI? (type of 
company or organization)
6. Have you encountered problems with your EDI 
system(s)? If so, what types of problems?
7. Are your EDI lacking capabilities? If so, what?
8. Using web-based systems?
9. For what?
10. Where was the web-based system developed?
11. Is web-based system accessible by outside parties?
12. Whom do you exchange data with via web-based 
systems? (type of company or organization)
13. Have you encountered problems with web-based 
systems? If so, what types of problems?
14. Are your web-based systems lacking capabilities? If so, 
what?
15. Future trends in Information Transfer?
results may not be generalizable to the trucking 
industry as a whole. However, the primary goal 
of the present study was to investigate the 
current level of EDI among the subset of the 
trucking industry most likely to have 
implemented EDI to link their supply chain 
partners. So, this limitation was considered 
acceptable.
This list of 75 trucking companies was then 
cross-referenced to the list of companies with one 
or more attendees at the 1999 International 
Council of Logistics Management (CLM) Confer­
ence in Toronto, Canada. This was done so that 
the survey could be e-mailed directly to a senior 
executive in each trucking company. Fifty-four 
of the largest 75 U.S motor carriers (72%) were 
represented at the 1999 international CLM 
conference. Finally, the most senior attendee 
was identified by job title (e.g., Presi-dent, VP- 
operations, VP-Information Systems, etc.) from 
the published list of conference attendees.
The survey was then sent via e-mail to named 
executives at 54 of the largest 75 motor carriers 
in the U.S. Due to the nature of this study, 
participants were not randomly selected in the 
strict sense. Rather, large motor carriers most 
likely to be engaged in both EDI and Internet 
systems were surveyed. A complete list of the 
companies surveyed is included in Table 2. The 
results of the survey are presented and discussed 
in the next section.
TABLE 2
MOTOR CARRIERS CONTACTED
United Parcel Service Vitran
Roadway Express, Inc. Southeastern Freight Line
Schneider National, Inc. Atlas Van Lines
Consolidated Freightways FFE Transportation
Penske Truck Leasing Trimac Specialized Carriers
Ryder Integrated CRST Logistics, Inc.
Logistics Crete Carrier Corporation
RPS, Inc. Covenant Transport
Con-Way Transportation Dart Transit
J. B. Hunt Logistics, Inc. Contract Freighters, Inc.
ABF Freight System Heartland Express
United Van Lines KLLM Transport Service,
Overnight Transportation Inc.
North American Van Burlington Motor Carriers
Lines Matlack, Inc.
American Freightways New Penn Motor Express
Werner Enterprise, Inc. Roberts Express
Swift Transportation USF Red Star, Inc.
USF Holland, Inc. Celadon Trucking
Allied Holdings APA Transport
Watkins Motor Lines Merchants Home Delivery
M. S. Carriers Mercer Transportation
Trimac Transportation New England Motor
U. S. Xpress Freight
Estes Express Lines Morgan Drive Away
Mayflower Transit Stevens Transport, Inc.
CTI Pitt Ohio Express, Inc.
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Nine of the 54 e-mailed surveys could not be 
delivered because of unknown or unrecognized 
addresses reducing the effective sample size to 43 
of the largest 75 U.S. motor carriers. Twenty-one 
of the 43 trucking executives completed and 
returned the questionnaire for a response rate of 
49 percent. This was somewhat higher that 
typical response rates for this type of survey 
probably because of the ease and convenience of 
e-mail replies. In fact, 17 of the 21 responses 
were made within 24 hours of the questionnaire’s 
receipt. The use of e-mail surveys in the logistics 
area seems promising for the future. Table 3 





Yes 100% No 0%
2. For what?
Shipment tracking, tracking billing, electronic 
payment, load tendering, and ordering
3. Where was EDI system developed?
In house 73% Outside Vendor 9%
Both 18%
4. Is EDI system accessible by outside parties?
Yes 27% No 55% No Response 18%
5. Whom do you exchange data with via EDI? (type 
of company or organization)
Shippers, consignees, other trucking companies, 
railroads, banks, auditors, paying agents, and freight 
brokers
6. Have you encountered problems with your EDI 
system(s)? If so, what types of problems?
No Problems 36% Some Problems 55%
No Response 9%
start-up problems, excessive cost, lack of true standards
7. Are your EDI lacking capabilities? If so, what?
Yes 55% No 45%
Lack of true standards
8. Using web-based systems?
Yes 82% No 18%
9. For what?
As alternative to EDI, for partners with limited or no 
EDI, trade EDI documents, signed purchase orders, 
shipment customer tracing, tendering orders.
10. Where was web-based system developed?
In House 91% Outside Vendor 9%
11. Is web-based system accessible by outside 
parties?
Yes 80% No 20%
12. Whom do you exchange data with via web-based 
systems? (type of company, organization)
Shippers, interline carriers, entire customers base, any 
customer not using EDI
13. Have you encountered problems with web-based 
systems? If so, what type of problems?
Yes 12% No 88%
Start-up bugs, some small customers don’t have access
14. Are your web-based systems lacking capabilities? 
If so, what?
Yes 14% No 60%
No Response 26%
15. Future trends in Information Transfer?
Standards (similar to ANSI X12) for Internet 
communication, more use of scanned (documents) info 
sharing, tracing EDI documents via Internet, faster 
dial-up process and faster data transmission
EDI use by large U.S. motor carriers is 
widespread with customer service still the major 
function supported. All the respondents 
indicated they used EDI to support one or more 
business functions. The only EDI transaction all 
respondents were using for customer service was 
shipment tracking. A majority of the largest U.S. 
motor carriers also reported using EDI to 
transmit freight bills and to generate internal 
shipment tacking documents.
Surprisingly, only 27 percent of the trucking 
companies said their EDI system was accessible 
to outside parties. There may be several possible 
explanations for this result. Two of the 
respondents noted they were unsure what was 
meant by the term “outside parties” and elected 
not to answer this question. It appears this 
question was not sufficiently clear to preclude 
different interpretations. It is also likely that
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several of the respondents use EDI with shippers 
contract carriage (versus common carriage). In 
this case the trucking companies may not 
consider the shipper to be an “outside” party.
Respondents who said their EDI systems were 
accessible to outside parties reported using EDI 
with a variety of supply chain partners. These 
included shippers, consignees, freight brokers, 
and interline trucking companies. Only a few of 
the respondents indicated they exchanged EDI 
documents with intermodal carriers (like rail­
roads or airlines) or with financial institutions. 
More than half of the largest motor carriers 
included in the sample indicated they had 
experienced problems with their EDI systems. 
Problems reported included startup 
malfunctions, excessive cost and lack of true 
standards.
Regarding the use of the Internet for business-to- 
business transactions, slightly over 80 percent of 
the respondents are currently using web-based 
technologies to support several functions. Uses 
include completing and transmitting signed 
purchase orders, shipment tracking and tracing 
by customers, exchanging EDI documents and 
shipment tendering orders. Interestingly, sev­
eral of the respondents said they use the Internet 
as an alternative to their EDI system and to 
communicate electronically with supply chain 
partners who have limited or no EDI capability. 
While the types of outside parties with Internet 
links to the motor carriers is very similar to the 
EDI links reported in the survey, significantly 
fewer respondents report having encountered 
problems with their web-based systems (12 
percent versus 36 percent with EDI problems). 
The results also indicate much greater 
satisfaction with the capabilities provided by the 
Internet versus EDI. Only 14 percent of the 
respondents reported their web-based systems 
lacked capabilities while 55 percent said their 
EDI system lacked capabilities.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Internet use is rapidly becoming a basic 
requirement for U.S. motor carriers as an effi­
cient means of conducting business with their 
supply chain partners. After 20 years of develop­
ment, the sole use of traditional EDI by the 
largest U.S. motor carriers seems to have 
peaked. The current focus on information tech­
nology, at least in this sample of the largest U.S. 
motor carriers, has shifted away from EDI 
technology to web-based information technology. 
There are many solid reasons for this shift.
Customers in supply chains are demanding high 
quality, timely information as well as on-line 
billing and payment throughout complex, often 
international distribution linkages. Customers 
of the large U.S. motor carriers also want flexible 
information systems that can very quickly 
change as information requirements change. 
This demand, expressed in this survey, clearly 
favors Internet systems and discourages the 
growth of new traditional EDI systems that are 
not flexible or nimble enough to keep pace with 
changes in business practices. Globalization is 
also a factor in the shift to the business use of the 
Internet by large trucking companies. Globali­
zation is increasing competition and adding new 
supply chain partners who lack EDI capability. 
The lower cost and speed of implementing new 
information links via the Internet relative to EDI 
is a third factor which seems to be influencing 
motor carriers.
The present survey showed that approximately 
90 percent of the largest U.S. motor carriers who 
responded were able to develop web-based 
systems in house, avoiding the high development 
costs often associated with the use of outside 
venders. Most large trucking companies appear 
to feel the costs of new EDI development and 
implementations outweigh potential benefits. 
Internet systems offer lower cost, more 
flexibility, and much faster implementation. 
Even proponents of EDI are saying EDI is too 
expensive, too complex and too inflexible and 
offers too few benefits for smaller motor freight 
shippers.
Apart from the development and implementation 
cost advantages the Internet offers over EDI, 
Internet solutions also appear to offer substan­
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tial monthly savings in communications cost. 
EDI network costs are generally based on a 
charge per character which discourages more 
volume. On the other hand, Internet access 
charges from an Internet service provider (ISP) 
are based on connectivity time or a flat monthly 
charge. Therefore, transmitting more data 
actually reduces the cost per character and 
encourages more volume.
Yet, survey results indicate that EDI is still very 
common among the largest motor carriers and 
will likely be used to exchange standard 
documents with large shippers for the fore­
seeable future. While motor earners in the U.S. 
are not developing new X12 transactions using 
EDIFACT design rules, existing X12 transactions 
will likely be maintained and used in conjunction 
with Internet transmission.
Investments made in EDI appear safe for now, 
but new investments in EDI by the largest motor 
carriers seem unlikely. Rather, smaller invest­
ments in Internet technologies appear to be more 
likely. Aside from the cost and time advantages, 
there may also be an important service reason for 
the shift to new supply chain information 
systems. When EDI systems were being de­
signed and developed, the business climate 
emphasized the efficient handling of large-scale 
business-to-business transactions. The current 
business climate emphasizes the end-user. Web- 
based technologies can link everyone in a supply 
chain with the ultimate customer.
CONCLUSIONS
This research found that the largest U. S. 
trucking companies are using both EDI and the 
Internet to facilitate a variety of transactions 
with their supply chain partners. Information 
technology has changed significantly since EDI
Barber, Norman F. (1998), “Will EDI Survive?” 
Transportation and Distribution, September, 
38(9): 39-43.
systems were first introduced. Motor carriers 
tend to use information technologies in response 
to customer demand as a matter of customer 
service rather than for internal information 
needs. The widespread appeal of the Internet 
combined with other contemporary factors, 
including the relative cost of new EDI systems 
versus Internet systems and the increasing 
complexity of supply chains, have led large U.S. 
motor carriers to develop new web-based systems 
for business-to-business transportation trans­
actions. The growth of EDI by the largest motor 
carriers has leveled off. While new EDI growth 
is unlikely for the U.S. motor carrier industry, 
current EDI systems are being used, especially 
with large shippers, and will likely be 
maintained for the foreseeable future.
Over the longer term, however, the lack of 
standard business practices and procedures 
among supply chain partners (often even within 
the same company) will tend to push trucking 
managers away from costly EDI solutions to 
cheaper, simpler and faster Internet solutions. 
In the seventies and eighties, EDI offered motor 
carriers and their customers the opportunity to 
eliminate much of the delay associated with the 
flow of goods. Most large motor carriers 
developed EDI systems and used them in a 
proprietary way to support the information 
demands of their larger customers. In the 
nineties, the Internet offered a cheaper, more 
flexible way to transmit important logistics data 
throughout an entire supply chain. This 
research has shown that the largest U.S. motor 
carriers are increasing their use of the Internet 
for both EDI and non-EDI transmissions. As 
long as the Internet can support the increasing 
volume and speed demands, large motor carriers 
will get closer and closer to paperless transport 
movements with all their customers.
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AN EVALUATION OF LINER 
STRATEGIES IN THE CONTEXT 





Academic researchers published a sophisticated model of world class logistics in 1995 and 
recently updated it with a model of 21st century logistics. Although such practices are yet to 
be perfected in the real world, it provides a yardstick for measuring logistical excellence. An 
innovative world class firm will pursue sustainable competitive advantage through well- 
integrated global supply chains. As liner operators are vital members of global supply chains, 
their contemporary strategies need particular scrutiny to identify elements of congruence or 
non-congruence. The paper discusses generic liner strategies and identifies the ideal strategy 
congruent with contemporary supply chain management practices.
INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of increasing business sophisti­
cation. The management of business functions 
has undergone radical reengineering and shifted 
more towards a system of managing processes 
rather than functions. Correspondingly, the 
management of business logistics has gained 
increasing attention in the last decade and is 
now considered a core competency of successful 
firms (Coyle, Bardi, and Langley, 1996). Such 
firms position themselves through various 
strategic choices to establish themselves as 
market leaders in the new millennium. They 
seek sustainable competitive advantage in the 
global marketplace through strategic supply
chain alliances that provide them logistical 
superiority. The supply chain alliance partners 
of these firms include their suppliers and 
suppliers’ suppliers, and customers as well as 
various transportation providers and inter­
mediaries.
As international business breaks new ground 
year after year, the management of business 
logistics will become increasingly global, complex 
and challenging. The shift towards world-wide 
manufacturing and assembling operations will 
lead to a greater role for ocean liner shipping 
companies who have provided a historically vital 
service for shippers, large and small alike. This 
is because of the increasing preponderance of
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time-based competition manifested today in 
various forms. These include the rapid adoption 
of innovative inventory management philo­
sophies, like just-in-time manufacturing, reduced 
cycle time and above all, a greater recognition of 
customer satisfaction.
While these developments are well recognized by 
all concerned, the dilemma concerning the eco­
nomic efficiency of ocean liner markets continues 
today as in the pre-containerization era. Their 
role in contemporary supply chains is beyond 
question. However, economists, policy-makers, 
and academicians perpetually debate the 
structure of liner markets and their efficiency 
outcomes. There is a continuing rift between 
shippers and carriers, and is often reported in 
trade journals (Mongeluzzo, 1999). There are 
also perceived fall-outs from the partial 
deregulation of shipping services in the U.S. 
(Bryant, 1999). The objective of this paper is to 
scrutinize contemporary ocean liner strategies 
given the much wider scope of ongoing changes 
in the management of business logistics and 
supply chain management in general. It will 
highlight areas of mutual congruity and conflict, 
and will look into a possible new order in liner 
shipping that may facilitate the establishment of 
efficient global supply chains.
THE WORLD CLASS 
LOGISTICS MODEL (1995) AND 
21st CENTURY LOGISTICS (1999)
The Michigan State Global Logistics Research 
Team released their findings on world class 
logistics in 1995 (Michigan State, 1995). The 
study, a continuation of their research on 
Leading Edge Logistics (Bowersox et al., 1989) 
and Logistics Excellence (Bowersox et al., 1992), 
led to the development of a model of World Class 
Logistics (WCL). It identified the need for simul­
taneous achievement of four key competencies— 
positioning, integration, agility and measure­
ment—for world class performance. Although the 
study did not find any firm that had perfected 
the simultaneous achievement and fusion of all 
components of the suggested model, it
established the existence of world class firms 
that had made a greater overall commitment in 
their effort towards logistical perfection 
(Michigan State, 1995).
Positioning, one of the four key competencies of 
the WCL model, refers to the selection of 
strategic and structural approaches to logistics 
operations. Integration leads to the creation of 
solid supply chain relationships. Agility is a 
firm’s competency with respect to relevancy, 
accommodation and flexibility. Measurement 
refers to the internal and external monitoring of 
results. The model identified seventeen measur­
able capabilities under each of the four key 
competencies. These capabilities of the four key 
competencies are the vehicles for seeking logis­
tical excellence. The researchers also showed 
that the seventeen identified capabilities are 
essentially the same throughout all developed 
nations and that being world class does matter 
(Michigan State, 1995).
21st Century Logistics, the most recent research 
report from the Michigan State Global Logistics 
Team, updated the WCL model and extended it 
to the broader concept of supply chain manage­
ment (Bowersox et al., 1999). It reports that the 
overall average of world class competency of 
firms did not change significantly from 1995 to 
1999 although there were significant improve­
ments in a number of the seventeen capabilities 
(Bowersox et al., 1999). The study found that 
while the positioning competency of firms 
improved, with a greater emphasis being given to 
providing a high level of service to key cus­
tomers, the decrease in several areas, including 
supply chain unification, information technology, 
information sharing, flexibility, process assess­
ment, and benchmarking, was significant. As a 
result, the new report focuses on the capabilities 
that facilitate internal and external integration. 
The attributes included in the 1995 WCL frame­
work were found insufficient for sustainable 
competitive advantage barely five years later and 
have been amended by incorporating factors that 
emphasize integrated relationships and enter­
prise extension (Bowersox et al., 1999).
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Logistics as a Core Competency
The real challenge of today’s managers is not 
merely attaining competitive superiority but 
maintaining it in the long run. This requires 
core competencies and efficient change man­
agement capabilities. A firm may not gain 
competitive advantage in the increasingly 
dynamic global marketplace through its manu­
facturing excellence alone. This is where logis­
tical competency and the efficiency of the supply 
chain alliance become critical for sustained 
competitive advantage. Such firms strive to 
make logistics management one of their core 
competencies and position themselves as leaders 
in the global marketplace. They segment their 
logistical services by providing different levels of 
service over and above their pre-existing superior 
level of basic service (Michigan State, 1995). As 
a result, they maintain multiple logistics systems 
concurrently. Through such a strategy, the firm 
can cocoon its customers and retain them. 
Customer segmentation is also advantageous 
because the most demanding customers could be 
looked upon as a source of innovation and change 
(Michigan State, 1995). Such a level of synergy 
reduces the market uncertainty of the customer 
as well as that of all channel members.
Supply chain alliances are an outgrowth of the 
core competency emphasis and the challenges of 
global competition. They are the modern coun­
terparts of vertical integration. They provide the 
benefits of joint synergy without the risk of 
ownership. The most basic requirement for alli­
ance development is that the strategic intent of 
all partners be compatible and complementary. 
Among world class firms, there is a strong 
commitment to increase leverage and reduce 
waste through supply chain alliances. The 1999 
study finds that responsiveness, flexibility, 
speed, dependability and continued sensitivity to 
cost will be the drivers of competitive advantage 
in future years (Bowersox et al., 1999).
A firm with advanced supply chain capability 
will carefully choose its transportation partners 
so as to position strategically in the global 
marketplace. Deep-sea movement of raw mater­
ials and finished goods still constitutes the most 
practical and logical way to move a good majority 
of them over long distances internationally. 
Although international shipping does not enjoy 
the privileged status of the previous era as the 
sole provider of vital transportation services, it 
remains a significant component of global supply 
chains as it did then. Liner shipping has a direct 
effect on the procurement and trading strategies 
of most firms active in the international business 
market. They play an important role in the 
simultaneous fusion of the components of the 
WCL model and the updated 21st Century 
Logistics model. As a vital member of global 
supply chains, they play a paramount role in 
facilitating world class logistical processes. 
Hence, the rationale for scrutinizing strategies of 
liner operators in the context of today’s 
sophisticated business logistics environment.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Many scholars have analyzed the strategies of 
liner shipping companies. Marx (1953) provides 
a good description of the strategies of liner 
companies during the formative years that 
included industrial self-regulation through 
conference rate making and service rationali­
zation, and also their strategies to limit both 
internal and external competition. Deakin and 
Seward (1973), Evans (1977) and Ellsworth 
(1979) provided further analysis of those 
strategies in the early containerization era. 
Recent contributions in this area include those by 
Heaver (1996) and Evangelista and Morvillo 
(2000). Evangelista and Morvillo (2000) para­
phrase the competitive liner strategies under the 
traditional categories of cost leadership and 
service differentiation. They argue that carriers 
may pursue their cost leadership strategy to the 
extent of acquiring other carriers and associate 
such an initiative at the most advanced stage of 
development of shipping lines. They identify four 
levels of logistical integration. At the lowest 
level, they provide solely maritime activities and 
then progressively move on to providing port 
terminal activities, inland transport services and 
ultimately logistical services beyond transporta­
tion. Their notion of service differentiation is
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derived through the carrier’s involvement in the 
customer supply chain and is induced by demand 
fluctuations. They state that shippers’ supply 
chain strategy is changing the role of trans­
portation providers. Their empirical analysis 
establishes that service differentiation and a 
high degree of inter-firm integration are 
relatively incompatible based on the sample they 
analyzed. They caution against generalizing 
their conclusion as there are other strategic 
options open to liner firms that are significantly 
involved in movements to interior points.
Limitations of the Evangelista/
Morvillo Model
The authors acknowledge that the only models 
they analyzed were cooperative alliances. Aside 
from this, the frames of reference used by 
Evangelista and Morvillo do not convey a 
complete picture of the contemporary supply 
chain model. Their usage of the term logistical 
integration conveys an incomplete message, and 
the examples they provide barely exceed door-to- 
door transportation capability, which is only one 
subset of the logistics system. Furthermore, the 
inter-organizational integration as referred to by 
them, cannot extend beyond the lower and 
medium levels they identified with cooperative 
shipping alliances. Hence, their empirical con­
clusion that service differentiation and a high 
degree of inter-firm integration are relatively 
incompatible is only to be expected, and a fact of 
life. Furthermore, as uncovered by the 21st 
Century Logistics Study (Bowersox et ah, 1999), 
the level of integration accomplished by the top 
manufacturing businesses themselves is 
unsatisfactory. That being the case, the 
relatively low level of inter-firm integration 
between liner companies and their customers 
and/or third party logistics service providers is 
an important albeit low-priority issue and 
premature for empirical analysis. The shippers 
themselves have a long way to go with their 
intra-firm integration prior to solidifying their 
inter-firm integration. It is suggested that one 
take a broader look at all liner strategies, and 
identify those that are congruent with the 
principles of contemporary supply chain
management prior to quantifying the level of 
integration between liner operators and their 
supply chain partners.
Methodology
The study will classify contemporary liner 
strategies into three mutually non-exclusive 
categories. Each of the strategies will be 
evaluated in the context of the Michigan State 
Models of supply chain management. 
Accordingly, the paper will identify liner 
strategies that would help the end-to-end 
distribution needs of their customers and 
contribute as a partner in the global value chain.
CLASSIFICATION OF LINER STRATEGIES
For the purposes of this study, liner strategies 
will be classified into three categories, viz., inde­
pendent, cooperation and integration strategies. 
A brief description of each of the categories 
follows next.
Independent Strategy
This is an old strategy and typically used by a 
new-entrant liner operator. The increasing scale 
barriers in container shipping have impacted the 
usefulness of this strategy and with the rare 
exception of the China Shipping Group, there 
have been hardly any high profile new entrants 
in the last few years. Even among the estab­
lished traditionally independent incumbents, all 
operators, with the exception of Evergreen, have 
joined one or more co-operative alliances. 
Evergreen’s niche is its cost leadership, and 
focuses primarily on port-to-port and round-the- 
world services. It offers limited door-to-door 
services using contractual agreements. While 
Evergreen may indeed become a long-run supply 
chain partner of one or more of their customers, 
it is unlikely that their role will extend beyond 
their core competency of providing traditional 
liner services. Furthermore, an independent 
may make use of integration strategies to posi­
tion themselves as a cost-effective global carrier 
as illustrated by Evergreen’s acquisition of Lloyd 
Triestino of Italy. For these reasons, the
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independent strategy is excluded from further 
analysis although conceptually it would fit well 
with a customer’s desire to negotiate individually 
with their supply chain partners.
Cooperative Strategies
Cooperative strategies are strategies pursued by 
liner operators to bring down their costs and 
enhance their capacity utilization. These include 
conferences and consortia as well as their recent 
incarnations of discussion agreements and 
alliances, respectively. Although conference 
agreements play a significant role in the north- 
south trades in particular, their role in arterial 
trade routes that include U.S. ports has been 
curtailed drastically and replaced by discussion 
agreements (Beargie, 2000). By their nature, a 
traditional conference agreement goes against 
the principles of contemporary logistics models. 
Membership in a liner conference creates a poor 
impression among one’s customers today rather 
than being the trademark of a quality service- 
provider. It would be perceived by today’s 
shipper community as an example of the non­
customer orientation of liner operators and 
hence, not in congruence with the contemporary 
supply chain management practices. As a result, 
their demise from the major trade routes 
characterized by shippers with sophisticated 
logistical needs is understandable. By the same 
token, the flexibility of discussion agreements 
makes them relatively tolerable for those 
shippers although there is a strong likelihood of 
their coming under increasing regulatory 
scrutiny (Beargie, 2000).
Cooperative strategies help liner operators to 
utilize their resources better and reduce their 
operating costs. The British and other West 
European shipping lines have been the 
traditional proponents of asset sharing. U.S.- 
based shipping lines historically stayed away 
from such activities for maintaining their 
operational freedom. The American companies 
resorted to various in-house techniques to control 
their costs rather than entering into consortia 
and other cooperative working arrangements 
(which their competitors elsewhere did). It
became clear to them in the early 1990's that 
individual cost-control measures could only go so 
far and further savings require greater coopera­
tion. This led to a literal explosion of strategic 
alliances in liner shipping beginning in the mid- 
1990's (Fossey, 1994; Damas, 1996; and Phillips, 
1996). Operators look for the ideal partner(s) 
with whom to combine their resources in the 
most effective manner whether those are ships, 
port terminals or sailing schedules. All major 
liner routes are dominated today by one or more 
carrier alliances.
The alliances between container operators 
generally improve the service frequency and 
reduce the transit time in key port-to-port 
corridors. This is vital for shippers who demand 
more frequent services on the busier sub-trades 
as it enables them to reduce their investment in 
inventory. The extensive geographical coverage 
of an alliance provides all partners with a greater 
choice of direct port calls. Through careful 
streamlining of joint services, it is possible to 
lower port and feeder service-related costs. 
Other possibilities include the potential for 
sharing of containers, chassis, equipment and 
terminals, shared use of feeder vessels, and 
streamlining of land-based intermodal services. 
Thus, liner operators stand to gain an overall 
increase in operating efficiency and some 
monetary savings through their alliances that 
could be passed on to their customers. However, 
there are significant hurdles in the path towards 
alliance implementation, especially in the non­
shipping sector. The level of difficulty associated 
with vessel and terminal sharing is rather low 
compared to that associated with other 
implementation steps, in particular those related 
to inland operations (Kadar, 1996).
Detractors of alliances point towards the 
increasing concentration in the sector. Initial 
reaction to this strategy was that it was merely 
a marketing gimmick, loading half the ship twice 
a week rather than loading the whole ship once 
a week. After a few years of experience, the 
consequences of liner alliances appear more 
daunting. Services such as the post-Panamax 
pendulum, a combination of all major east-west
Fall 2000 59
arterial trade routes linking Asia with the U.S. 
West Coast and Europe and/or U.S. East Coast 
through the Suez Canal, are provided by the 
alliances. Such services raise strong entry 
barriers for all but the exceptionally strong 
independents (like Evergreen Lines of Taiwan). 
It has been observed that carrier alliances only 
look inward and do not focus on the needs of the 
customer or the supply chain, and lack customer- 
orientation (Berzon, 1996). Furthermore, as 
these arrangements do not truly rationalize 
excess tonnage, those carriers that embraced 
alliance-formation as the panacea for all their ills 
are likely to be disappointed. By the same token, 
the alliances will only work as long as the part­
ners maintain their comparable competitiveness 
and efficiency. There is no guarantee that this 
strategy will be anything more than a short-run 
arrangement as is well illustrated by the 
frequent shuffling of alliance partners for 
immediate operational gains. As a result, 
membership in a global alliance or a consortium 
also has limited value from a contemporary 
supply chain perspective. It is unlikely that this 
strategy would be particularly appealing to a 
customer intent on building long-lasting supply 
chain alliances.
Integration Strategies
The study will analyze vertical and horizontal 
integration strategies of liner operators as they 
have a direct relevance to the provision of global 
supply chains.
Vertical integration. Historically, it has been 
argued that it was the introduction of liner 
shipping in the early nineteenth century that 
eliminated the need for integrating merchant 
and deep-sea shipping (Casson, Barry, and 
Horner, 1986). Casson and his team studied 28 
shipping companies operating in, or controlled 
from the UK. The study found that a significant 
number of the shipping companies were involved 
in agency services, freight forwarding, steve­
doring, warehousing, providing port facilities, 
road haulage and distribution. Casson credits 
the above developments to the operational 
flexibility introduced through containerization,
and emphasizes that containerization has 
strengthened the incentive to integrate shipping 
with other modes of transportation and port 
facilities (1986).
The unitization of liner cargo by using ISO 
marine containers opened up a plethora of 
opportunities for liner operators. The use of 
large container vessels gave them the necessary 
economies of size in their deep-sea shipping 
movements without unduly prolonging the time 
spent in port. With the elimination of legal 
impediments to intermodalism, human ingenuity 
began to overcome the traditional boundaries of 
liner service that until then did not extend 
beyond the immediate vicinity of ports. Thus, 
with the arrival of the intermodal era, a new 
cycle of innovation began in liner shipping. 
Intermodal systems began to emerge and 
establish under the leadership of liner 
companies. It necessitated the coordination of 
ship arrival times with train schedules and their 
expeditious inland movement. But, the 
traditional liner feature of encouraging service 
competition made it imperative that intermodal 
capability be a competitive essential rather than 
a mere option. As cargo volumes reached a 
critical level, deep-sea liner operators began to 
take over the operations of their intermodal 
associates with the twin goals of expanding their 
area of control and reducing their costs. When 
one liner operator establishes itself as a multi­
modal entity, competing firms are compelled to 
undertake similar operations. In addition to the 
acquisition of inland transportation companies, 
other vertical integration efforts by liner 
shipping companies have included warehouse 
and distribution centers, freight forwarders, 
customs-house brokers, and EDI firms. The 
transition of liner operators into total trans­
portation entities has been referred to as one of 
the most exciting developments of the intermodal 
revolution (McKenzie, North, and Smith, 1989).
However, this strategy began to backfire in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As the intermodal 
systems of vertically integrated liner operators 
began to mature, their profitability began to 
decrease rather than increase. The reasons cited
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for this includes the excess capacity in liner 
markets and the alleged cross-subsidization of 
inland moves by the deep-sea leg. Furthermore, 
it appears that some liner operators made some 
acquisitions that were not integrated even after 
a prolonged period of gestation. They simply 
acquired channel members purely to keep up 
with their competitors, or out of grand 
expectations of creating the best vertically inte­
grated transportation structure. This led to 
significant restructuring of top liner companies 
like American President Companies, Sea-Land, 
Nedlloyd and P&OCL that began in the early 
1990's and is still continuing as illustrated by the 
recent sale of the APL stack-train services. The 
top tier liner operators are thus streamlining 
their investments and finetuning their networks.
There are fundamental concerns associated with 
the vertical integration strategies of liner 
operators. Part of this stems from the inherent 
incompatibility between the deep-sea mode and 
the land-based modes of transportation. Ship­
ping has high fixed costs and low variable costs 
while the land-based modes of transport have low 
fixed and high variable costs (Wood and Johnson, 
1995). This results in significant economic in­
compatibility when a liner operator attempts to 
run its vertically integrated operation. Further­
more, shipping companies have a very traditional 
hierarchical management structure whereas 
running an in-house integrated (liner-oriented) 
supply chain requires more of a team-based, 
horizontal management structure. Thus, this 
liner strategy, although ideally suited for 
facilitating global supply chains, is not easy to 
implement and requires a virtual catharsis of 
traditional liner management philosophy.
Horizontal integration. It was believed 
initially for many reasons that containerization 
would reinforce the conference system and its 
market power (Davies, 1990). Liners began 
horizontal integration as a means of amassing 
the huge investments required in providing an 
efficient, containerized liner service. Financial 
interests and even governmental interests have 
promoted the operational integration of container 
operators under their jurisdiction to attain
economies of scale in the environment that 
containerization spawned (UNCTAD, 1970).
Although one could conjure different variations 
of the horizontal integration theme, the only 
model considered here is a merger or acquisition 
involving liner companies. An examination of 
such activities in the liner sector shows two 
divergent trends that a recent trade journal 
categorized as the full integration type and the 
multi-brand “federal” type (Lloyd’s Shipping 
Economist, 2000). Examples of the first category 
include the creation of P&O Nedlloyd Lines, the 
NOL-APL merger and the Maersk-Sealand 
merger. All these mergers have resulted in the 
creation of a single entity that has had a 
remarkable impact on the rest of the players, 
including the disruption of the alliance 
structures in the first two cases. The “federal” 
model implies that the parent company oversees 
the activities of one or more independently 
operated autonomous subsidiaries. Separate 
brand names are maintained and run as 
individual lines as in the case of CP Ships, 
Hamburg Sud and CSAV. There is little 
empirical evidence to support the superiority of 
one model over the other. In general, this 
strategy is also designed to lower the unit cost of 
operation through gains in economies of scale 
very similar to that of the cooperative strategies 
discussed earlier. However, it provides greater 
control in the decision making process albeit at a 
heightened level of business risk. While there 
are likely to be even more defensive takeovers in 
the market, the impact of this strategy from a 
global supply chain perspective is unclear. 
However, one can conjecture that the emergence 
of a merged strong operator (such as the P& O 
Nedlloyd Lines, or the new APL brand, or 
Maersk-Sealand) with global capability is 
attractive to a shipper with sophisticated supply 
chain demands. This is especially the case when 
these operators also possess significant end-to- 
end distribution capability besides having an 
exceptionally well-positioned core competency. 
Such capabilities are irrelevant unless the 
carrier exhibits the willingness and flexibility to 
work with their customers and design tailored 
logistics packages. This would have been
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unlikely but for the introduction of recent 
regulatory changes, and are discussed briefly 
next.
CHANGES IN LINER 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The global supply chain environment underwent 
dramatic changes resulting from recent institu­
tional interventions in the liner market. Speci­
fically, the U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 was 
amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 
1998 (OSRA) and partially deregulated the liner 
services in the U.S. foreign commerce. Although 
the amendments enacted are numerous, the ones 
that have a greater impact from a supply chain 
perspective are related to the introduction of 
confidential service contracts.
The service contract provision is the most 
deregulatory component of the new legislation. 
It has expanded the scope and purpose of service 
contracts from the original 1984 Act and made it 
a truly powerful marketing tool for shipping 
companies to differentiate their services from 
their competitors. The new service contract 
provision allows the co-existence of a 
discriminatory contract carriage system with the 
common carriage objectives of the tariff system. 
Although contracts need to be filed confidentially 
with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), 
except for contracts on exempt commodities, the 
previous requirement to file essential terms of a 
service contract in tariff format for public review 
is seriously curtailed. Strategic components of a 
service contract such as inland points for 
intermodal movements, freight rates, service 
commitments and liquidated damages for non­
performance can now remain confidential. 
Conferences and consortia will not have the right 
to restrict its members from negotiating 
individual contracts with shippers although they 
may issue voluntary guidelines relating to terms 
and procedures for such contracts. The voluntary 
guidelines must be submitted to the Federal 
Maritime Commission. Another significant de­
parture from the 1984 Act is that a contract may 
be based on percentage of cargo of the shipper, 
not permissible earlier because of its connotation
to a loyalty contract. Loyalty contracts are still 
illegal under OSRA. However, OSRA has altered 
the definition of such contracts to one that 
includes a deferred rebate. Individual shippers, 
shippers’ association as well as a group of 
unaffiliated shippers may enter into service 
contracts. Similarly, a group of carriers other 
than a conference is also allowed to enter into 
service contracts.
Although the new service contract provision 
allows shippers to sign confidential service 
contracts of a global nature, shippers and 
carriers have been slow to change their business 
practices because of their lack of familiarity with 
the new freedoms. An informal FMC survey 
found that 83% of 408 contracts filed by the top 
13 ocean common carriers in the U.S. foreign 
trades lacked confidentiality clauses and only 
77% of the remaining 17% required complete 
confidentiality (Beargie, 2000). Furthermore, a 
majority of the contracts are still negotiated 
during four to six weeks in early spring and 
many contracts are still confined to a single trade 
route with duration of one year or less and there 
are very few customized contracts. It is impor­
tant to note that operators such as Maersk- 
Sealand are reporting a higher than anticipated 
number of global contracts (Beargie, 2000). As 
these cargoes are typically high value items and 
account for a higher percentage based on overall 
cargo volume, it is possible that such contracts 
will lead to dedicated supply chain alliances in 
the future. Maersk Logistics (Gillis, 2000) and 
APL Logistics are two outstanding examples of 
integrated supply chain initiatives currently 
available to international shippers.
CONCLUSIONS AND 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The paper discussed developments in contem­
porary supply chain models such as the world 
class logistics (WCL) model and the 21st Century 
Logistics Model. It also scrutinized three major 
categories of generic liner operating strategies. 
All strategies have their respective pros and cons 
when viewed in the context of establishing global 
supply chain alliances. Even the much maligned
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conference strategy has the advantage of 
providing regular and reliable services at 
predictable freight rates. The most basic 
incongruity arises when shipper clients are 
unable to deal one-on-one with their liner 
shipping partners. Ideally, the vertically 
integrated independent liner operators would 
provide the best fit and be most congruent in 
supply chain alliances as they could possess 
logistical capability as well as flexibility. A 
vertically integrated liner operator who is 
capable of providing consistently reliable and 
tailored end-to-end distribution services will be 
a true asset in any world class firm’s supply 
chain. However, that strategy, attempted by a 
handful of liner operators in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's, turned out to be structurally incom­
patible with liner economics and organizational 
structure in the real world. Accordingly, this is 
not a feasible option for shippers today. The next 
best option for transportation managers is to 
seek a liner operator pursuing a horizontal
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TEACHING LOGISTICS STUDENTS TO TAKE OWNERSHIP OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT
Frank W. Davis, University of Tennessee 
Kenneth J. Preissler, Logistics Insights Corporation
Logistics systems, developed gradually over the past decades, are undergoing necessary radical change in this era of 
increasing global competition. This article describes an approach taken by the authors to teach logistics students 
how to take ownership of designing their own information infrastructure and how to use it to make their 
organizations more flexible, providing more strategic options.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in information systems technology such as data base management systems, bar code scanning, 
telecommunications, and image processing have enabled logistics and information managers with vision to 
reengineer the way the firm conducts its business. The usage of mainframe computers, personal computers, and 
logistics information systems has been widely studied (Gustin 1989). These studies have universally concluded that 
there has been a rapid growth in the usage of computers and logistics information systems.
Computer Usage in the Classroom
The usage of computer applications in a logistics course has also been studied. Rao, Stenger and Wu stated that 
there are several approaches to integrating computers into the classroom in a business curriculum, each with its 
individual advantages and drawbacks (1992).
Table 1 about here
Systems Development in Practice
The study of the information systems development process of computer applications has been almost universally left 
up to the computer science, software engineering, and information systems educators and practitioners.
y = a2 - 2ax + x2 (1)
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